Constructs of time and history : a descriptive study of early adolescent thinking. by Carey, Deborah Davis
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014
1-1-1982
Constructs of time and history : a descriptive study
of early adolescent thinking.
Deborah Davis Carey
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carey, Deborah Davis, "Constructs of time and history : a descriptive study of early adolescent thinking." (1982). Doctoral Dissertations
1896 - February 2014. 3767.
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/3767
UMASS/AMHERST
3i20bboi35abaaQ
CONSTRUCTS OF TIME AND HISTORY:
A DESCRIPTIVE STUDY OF EARLY ADOLESCENT THINKING
A Dissertation Presented
By
DEBORAH DAVIS CAREY
Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF "LDUCATrON
May 1982
Education
IDeborah Davis Carey
All Rights Reserved
1982
ii
CONSTRUCTS OF TIME AND HISTORY:
A DESCRIPTIVE STUDY OF EARLY ADOLESCENT THINKING
A Dissertation Presented
By
DEBORAH DAVIS CAREY
Approved as to style and content by:
iii
This dissertation is dedicated to
George and Merritt
iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Many people have helped me with this dissertation. Along the
way there have been those colleagues who encouraged me in my efforts
to understand early adolescents and supported me in my endeavors to
create learning environments appropriate particularly for them. John
Arnold, Frank C. Barger, Jr., Peter Cohen, and Robert L. Smith all
worked with me at the Sidwell Friends School in Washington, D.C.,
where I first became involved with, and then very much committed to,
this age group. Later, Nat French, because of his consuming interest
in early adolescents, provided further support for my commitment to
this age group during my early years at the University of Massachusetts.
Also, there have been those who have guided my graduate study.
For helping me to begin to understand the complexity of Jean Piaget,
I am thankful to George Forman, Dick Konicek, and Klaus Schultz of
the University of Massachusetts. Likewise, credit should go to Alfred
Karlson, also of the University of Massachusetts, who allowed me to
try my first research in the Piagetian mode. Eleanor Duckworth of
Harvard University has been particularly helpful, sharing with me
her joy and skill in working with young people, asking leading ques-
tions that helped me focus my research, and unstintingly giving of
her time and intellect. Arthur W. Eve, of the Institute for Govern-
mental Services at the University of Massachusetts, provided tremendous
assistance in the research design, particularly with the methodology.
V
My dissertation committee has provided continual support and
guidance. From the beginning, Grace Craig, my chairperson, has
directed me in an exciting program, led me to examine carefully what
I was doing, and made me think about exactly what it was that I was
planning to investigate. Horace Reed, with his thoughtful and
probing questions, encouraged me to consider my ideas in relation to
other cultures and ideologies, thus providing a broader perspective
for my work. Charles Moran of the University of Massachusetts English
Department helped me clarify my writing and offered perceptive obser-
vations on my research. This committee as a whole, while maintaining
high standards for me, has never been picky—only supportive and
constructively critical—an approach that made the task of writing a
dissertation an enjoyable one.
Then, too, there are those who, in addition to the people already
mentioned, cared about what I was doing. They encouraged me,
admonished me to get on with it, reminded me of deadlines, and gave
help when it was needed. For this generous and consistent support, I
thank William E. Allen, Ronald Bell, Margaret Clardy, Louis B. Fisher,
Paul Larson, and John M. Thompson. I also thank, for their interest
and support, my mother, Alice M. Davis, my father-in-law, James Carey,
and many other friends and relatives.
The University of Massachusetts Computer Center, with its gener-
ous policy, enabled me to obtain a grant to use the computer and
provided me with programming assistance. I thank the Amberst-Pelham
vi
Regional School Committee of Amherst, Massachusetts, for funding a
sabbatical leave, which gave me time to write.
Obviously, without the cooperation of the subjects this study
would have been impossible; therefore, I would especially like to
thank these young people for their enthusiastic participation. No
dissertation can be written without the support of those closest to
the writer—so I thank my husband and daughter, George and Merritt,
to whom this study is dedicated. They critiqued the writing and put
up with my long hours at the typewriter. They saw to it that the
marketing got done and the meals on the table. And, of course, they
both provided moral and emotional support.
vii
ABSTRACT
Constructs of Time and History:
A Descriptive Study of Early Adolescent Thinking
(May, 1982)
Deborah Davis Carey, B.A.
,
Middlebury College
M.A.
,
Indiana University, Ed.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Grace J. Craig
This descriptive study investigated constructs of time and
history articulated by junior and senior high school students in
a small university town in New England. The intent of the study
was to identify the types of constructs students create and to
analyze them from a developmental, constructionist point of view.
Constructs were categorized as concrete, transitional, or abstract
and then analyzed in terms of types of constructs created by students
of different grades, achievement levels, and sex.
Data for the study were gathered by the administration of an
open-ended questionnaire and by interviews. The questionnaire was
administered twice, six months apart, to a cross section of students
representing three levels of instructional grouping—basic, standard,
and advanced— to determine whether or not a change occurred. Inter-
views with 17 students following each questionnaire administration
provided elaboration of the questionnaire data and descriptive
detail.
Analysis of the data revealed that the creation of concrete.
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transitional, and abstract constructs of time and history is related
to a student’s grade and achievement level but not to sex. Regard-
less of grade, students in basic level (lowest) classes produced
concrete constructs. Students in standard (average) classes in
grades seven and eight produced concrete and transitional constructs
and showed little change during the year. Ninth-graders in standard
classes changed their constructs from 14% transitional and abstract
in the fall to 50% transitional and abstract in the spring. Students
in advanced (highest) level classes in all grades produced 50%
transitional and abstract constructs. All eighth-graders in advanced
classes produced transitional or abstract constructs in the spring.
Above the eighth grade, advanced level classes produced, with two
exceptions, no concrete constructs. To summarize: basic classes
of all grades changed little during the year. Standard classes
changed significantly during the ninth grade. Advanced classes
changed significantly during the eighth grade.
In addition to quantitative data, this study gathered rich
descriptive detail, which provides insight into the creative and
inventive thinking of early adolescents. This study also documents
the wider perspective-taking , noted by other researchers, that develops
as students become capable of more abstract thought. Because this
study shows that early adolescents do not think as adults do and
because most textbooks are written from an adult perspective, this
study has implications for revision of textbooks and instructional
materials, based on the cognitive developmental level of the students.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
I have been teaching young adolescents for years. They are
exciting and interesting. Given the chance, they show tremendous
creativity and ingenuity, and yet seldom do these qualities surface
in the classroom. There are many reasons for this classroom latency,
but one of the most fundamental may be that we approach what we are
teaching from an adult perspective and hence expect our young adoles-
cents to respond as adults do. We reward intellectual activity of
young people when it mimics adult thinking, not when it is the unique
construction of the curious and active early adolescent mind.
One reason we probably don't value constructs made by early
adolescents is that we know little about the nature of their thought
patterns. Little, if any, narrative research exists describing
what early adolescents think, how they actually create concepts of
authority, religion, or history and time, to mention just a few from
the social studies. Social studies appears, from a recent study, to
be an area of particular concern in terms of student understanding
of concepts. According to Morrisset (1980), secondary students find
social studies irrelevant to their lives and they do not fully under-
stand social studies concepts (cf. Morrissett, Hawke, & Superka, 1980).
Of the many possible reasons for students' lack of comprehension, one
of the most significant might be our failure to consider a student s
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2cognitive, developmental level in planning curriculum and instruc-
tional materials. If we knew more about student constructs, we
might find that our adult expectations of early adolescents are
developmentally inappropriate and certainly not apt to foster the
creative intellectual endeavor young adolescents are capable of.
What do these young adolescents think? Given the opportunity,
what constructs will they create? To begin exploring the potential
of these young minds, this study examines two concepts as young people,
grades seven through twelve, construct them. Time and history seem
particularly appropriate concepts for this exploration of early
adolescent thinking for a variety of reasons. My own experience,
though it covers every discipline, has most often and most recently
involved the teaching of social studies. I have become increasingly
aware of the tremendous difficulty young people have making sense out
of long historical periods, understanding how something that happened
three hundred years ago can have anything to do with them, grasping
the connection between centuries and dates, and comprehending the
relationship between B.C. and A.D. Recently, for example, I showed
a short film about Mesopotamia to some seventh-graders. Dates were
frequently flashed onto the screen, and since, of course, the time
under consideration was pre-Christian, the numbers got lower.
3,000 B. C., 1,500 B.C. 300 B.C. "Is this going backwards?" one
student asked. It is this kind of dilemma, that social studies
teachers face so often, that first led me into research of student
3constructs of time and history.
Another reason for choosing time and history as concepts to
investigate is that they have not been examined from a developmental,
constructionist viewpoint as have some concepts associated with the
social studies. Friendship and justice, for example, have been stu-
died quite widely on the elementary level, while authority and
political systems have been studied among secondary students.
An additional reason for investigating time is its elusiveness,
its resistance to being pinned down and defined as a specific entity.
In some guises time is abstract, and yet, unlike many other abstract
concepts, it lacks a direct concrete manifestation. The abstract
concept of authority, for example, appears concretely as a policeman,
a principal, a parent or guardian. Religion appears as a minister, a
priest, or a synagogue. Even such concepts as length and space offer
concrete units of measurement such as inches or centimeters to compute
distance, area, or volume. The concrete manifestations of time
expressed by ten-year-olds, however—" a clock," "hours, minutes, and
days"—appear to represent only obliquely the abstract concept of
time expressed by an older student as "an eternal, moving force.
But perhaps the most compelling reason to investigate constructs
of time is that a definition of time does not seem to be taught to
children. We certainly teach them how to tell time, and we certainly
emphasize the importance of using time well to make sure they get
things done on time. Yet, we seldom tell them what time actually is.
4Because we don't usually define time for children, their constructs
of It are likely to be their own creations, more often than not the
products of their active minds trying to figure something out and
tell what it is. Consequently, their constructs of time probably
give us more insight into how early adolescent minds work than do
constructs such as authority, social structure, and government which
are usually defined and taught to children.
We do teach a definition of history early in a child's education,
but because of the connection adults make between time and history,
an investigation of time constructs seems incomplete without an
investigation of history constructs. Indeed, one of the problems in
social studies classrooms may be that teachers automatically assume
and understand a connection between time and history whereas students
do not.
When learning concepts, young people first create concrete con-
structs and then, as they gradually evolve along a developmental
continuum, create increasingly complex and abstract constructions as
they get older. This developmental constructionist view of knowledge
assumes that a child constructs and reconstructs concepts, which
evolve along a gradual continuum from concrete to abstract as he grows
older. A child who interprets the world concretely will probably
create concrete constructions of time and history. A child functioning
in a concrete mode can focus on several aspects of a situation at one
5time, can understand transformations, and can reverse the direction
of his thinking, but generally he needs to operate directly from phys-
ical data or experience. A child who interprets the world abstractly
will probably create abstract constructions. A child functioning in
an abstract manner (which Piaget termed the formal operational mode)
can transcend immediate concrete reality. He can make mental adjust-
ments to changes in reality. He can imagine a multitude of possibil-
ities or outcomes to a given situation. He can logically define a
problem, identify variables, and systematically eliminate them. His
thought is flexible. In short, he can, unlike the concrete opera-
tional child, think about his thoughts and manipulate them the way a
concrete operational child manipulates objects. He can deal with
abstractions
.
As children move along the developmental continuum, their concept
constructions grow increasingly abstract. The concept of time, for
example, may be constructed by a child who operates in a concrete
mode as simply "a clock." At the other end of this developmental
continuum, an individual who operates in a formal operational mode
may construct time, one tenth-grader put it, as a "culturally-
determined, organizational scheme." Between the concrete constructs
and the abstract constructs, a child will construct a variety of
increasingly complex views of time as he moves along the develop-
mental continuum. These transitional constructs contain elements of
both concrete and abstract thought. We can speculate about concrete
6constructs of time, transitional constructs of time, and abstract
constructs of time, but, until some research is done, we can't state
how children actually construct the two extremes; and we certainly do
not know what various constructions a child creates during the two
to five transitional years it takes him to evolve from concrete to
formal constructions.
This study surveyed students in grades seven through twelve in
a public junior-senior high school in a small university town in New
England to find out what their constructs of time and history are. An
open-ended questionnaire was administered to students, asking them to
tell what they think time is, what they think history is, and how they
think they are connected to history. Questionnaire data were supple-
mented by interview data to provide detailed, descriptive elaboration
of the concepts of time and history. Questionnaires were administered
in the fall of 1980 and then again in the spring of 1981 to the same
sample to determine if any change in constructs and thoughts about time
and history had occurred.
It was anticipated that seventh-and eighth-grade constructs of
time and history would differ qualitatively from those of high school
students. More specifically, this study examined the hypotheses that:
students who construct time as an abstraction will con-
struct history as an abstraction;
construction of abstract constructs will be related to
grade, sex, and class level (basic, standard, advanced);
7most seventh- and eighth-graders will not construct time
as an abstraction;
eighth-grade girls in average and advanced classes will
change their constructs from concrete to transitional
or abstract during the year;
students in basic classes will create concrete constructs.
In addition to examining these hypotheses, this study elicited commen-
tary from students about how they learned about time and history and
about how and why they think their ideas of time and history have
changed
.
Although relying on student verbalization of constructs for data,
and thus limited by the ability and willingness of students to express
in language what they know, this exploratory investigation provides
insight into the development of time and history constructs in early
adolescents. Students who express their ideas with difficulty probably
will not elaborate their constructs as thoroughly as those who verbalize
easily, but they will most likely state them in a simplified form.
The emphasis in this research on individuals and their particular
constructs provides the type of data scholars are beginning to emphasize
as important and necessary for understanding young people. Robert
Selman pointed out in 1978: "Determining the stages of cognitive or
social development of a particular child leads the professional to
understand how the child looks at the world and to avoid expectations
of conceptual and emotional abilities that the child has not yet
developed" (p. 300). Deanna Kuhn and Herbert Ginsburg also urge
8looking at individuals' understandings and concepts as opposed to
groups'. Kuhn states that only by investigating individual world views
can we begin to understand the "complex interplay between the develop-
ing individual and the specific cultural-historical environment in
which this development takes place" (1978, p. 92). Similarly, Ginsburg
asserts: "Future research should concentrate on the expanding know-
ledge of the child's spontaneous understanding of the various subject
matter areas" (p . 317). Ginsburg recommends using the clinical method
to explore, directly, children's knowledge and maintains that this
type of research has "great potential for education" (p. 317). He also
recommends the adjustment of curricular materials to fit with the
child's level of understanding. This study of constructs of time and
history employs a methodology and a content focus which begins to
provide some of the insight called for by these scholars and suggests
implications for revision of instruction and curricular materials
based on the cognitive developmental level of students.
Because of the exploratory nature of this study, the data are pri-
marily qualitative and descriptive. The categorization of questionnaire
responses does suggest some tentative, quantitative conclusions about
grades and instructional levels that create concrete, transitional, or
abstract constructs of time and history. Still, the most tantalizing
insights into the richness and creativity of the early adolescent mind
comes from the rich, descriptive statements provided by the students
on the questionnaires and particularly in the interviews.
CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Introduction
Time and history are universal concepts. They appear in every
culture, yet the nature of these abstract concepts varies from culture
to culture. In some cultures, history is mythic and not tied to dates;
in others, it is linear and specifically dated. In some cultures, time
is circular; in others, as with history, it is linear. Obviously, the
constructs created by western middle class adolescents mirror the
concepts held by the culture they live in.
This review discusses briefly the concept of time as expressed
in Western and non-Western cultures, including mention of how the concept
of time in the western religious and intellectual tradition has influ-
enced the development of theories of knowledge. Discussion of one of
these theories, the constructivist viewpoint, leads into a presentation
of knowledge construction in the early adolescent and a brief synopsis
of previous studies considering the early adolescent and time and
history. Finally, a comment on the literature as a whole concludes
that descriptive research into constructs is needed.
Non-Western and Western Time
Time has been studied from a wide range of perspectives, and these
studies demonstrate that time affects virtually every aspect of exist-
ence. Whether the cyclical time of the seasons, the biological time
9
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that governs bodily activity, the rhythmic time of music, or the
imposition of hours, minutes, and days onto the natural rhythm of
the earth, time permeates every culture. This universal notion of
time, however, assumes different manifestations in different cultures.
Each culture demonstrates some aspects of time unique to it, but gen-
eral similarities about time can be observed among non-Uestern
cultures as a unit and among Western cultures as a unit.
Non-Western cultures tend to view time as cyclical and as occur-
ring on two levels. One level deals with the here and now, with the
dally functioning of individuals. The appropriate time for planting
or for visiting a relative must be determined. This immediate level
of time co-exists with a second level of time in non-western cultures.
The second level of time is removed from the daily functionings of
the culture and represents a cosmic circular mythic entity. The
circular nature of this level of time assures the culture that life
is continuous and repetitive; one's life on earth is a segment of this
continuous circle—a touching down so to speak. Viewing time as
circular and repetitive creates a view of life as non-linear, that is,
as not necessarily progressing in a forward, straight line (Gardet, 1976;
Kagame, 1976; Larre, 1976; Nakamura, 1966; Needham, 1966; Pannikar , 1976).
Western cultures, however, view things differently. Permeated by
the Judeo-Christian tradition. Western cultures view time as one dimen-
sional. Because the Judeo-Christian tradition maintains an historically
defined beginning and assumes the task of carrying out Gods's will on
11
earth, time in Western cultures is viewed as progressive. If there
was a beginning, there is an end and history is moving forward toward
this end with man as the vehicle for the work of God. Thus all
activity in Western cultures, in the final analysis, is based on the
historical cultural perspective that man exists to serve the purpose
of God (Benjamin, 1966; Lloyd, 1976; Neher, 1976; Pattara, 1976;
Ricoeur, 1976; Russell, 1966).
Constructionist Theory
It is within this one-dimensional progressive context of time and
purpose that Western culture has developed its thought and knowledge
with its emphasis on logic and scientific deduction (Benjamin, 1966;
Gurevich, 1977). Questions such as "What is knowledge?" and "When and
how do we know that we know?" go as far back in this Western tradition
as records exist. Epistemologists and philosophers have asked, "What
is the mind?" and "How does it get new knowledge?" These thinkers
have espoused a variety of theories and speculations to answer these
questions over the centuries. One of these theories, genetic episte-
mology, based in the Western scientific tradition and presented widely
by Jean Piaget, maintains that the individual is born with certain
innate abilities but that individuals develop and increase their know-
ledge through rational interaction of these abilities with the environ-
ment. This notion is essentially the constructivist position. Though
the individual operates in increasingly complex ways as he or she grows
older, the basic process of interaction remains the core of the
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construction of new knowledge. As Piaget would have explained it, the
organism uses the set of structures (knowledge) it has to interact
with the environment (stimuli) . Those stimuli it can readily fit into
what it already knows add to its knowledge on that level. Those that
make no sense it ignores. Those that are in-between, the organism
may try to fit in with what it does know, by doing some rearranging
of its structures. This fitting-in, in turn, if successful, may lead
to new knowledge and a new way of organizing a new set of structures
(Damon, 1977; Duckworth, 1977; Gelman, 1979; Kamii, 1979; Piaget, 1964;
Reid, 1979; Shantz, 1975).
A major component of the constructionist view of knowledge is
the concept of stage theory. This concept is generally supported in
the literature and is articulated effectively and consistently by a
wide range of scholars. Piaget has been one of the most influential
of those who have observed that children’s thought develops by progres-
sing through stages in a definite order (Adelson, 1971; Bart & Smith,
1974; Damon, 1980; Flavell & Wohlwill, 1969; Hunt, 1969; Kohlberg &
Gilligan, 1971; Loevinger, 1979; Piaget, 1964, 1971, 1973, 1977;
Pollack, 1969; Protinsky, 1975; Selman, 1976; Sigel, 1969; Turiel, 1974,
1977; Walker & Richards, 1979).
Flavell and Wohlwill (1969) present a clear exposition of stage
theory in which they describe it as a structurally defined entity
which "can serve to unify a set of otherwise quite disparate and seem-
ingly unrelated behaviors" (p. 92). Stage theory holds that individuals
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move from one stage to the next In a sequential manner through a
series of cognitive changes
. A variety of scholars have presented
descriptions of how this takes place, but all these descriptions
revolve around Piaget’s notion of disequilibrium-- forcing the indi-
vidual to restructure his cognitive tools.
Flavell and Wohlwill (1969) have articulated four steps required
for an individual to develop new cognitive structures, and David
Moshman (1977) has demonstrated that, at least in the acquisition of
formal operations, these steps do take place. In the first step the
individual has not begun to acquire the operation and hence fails at
every task requiring it. In the second step, the individual has begun
to acquire the operation and can use it some of the time, depending on
the difficulty of the task. In the third step, the individual has
easy access to the operation and is successful at tasks requiring it
almost all the time; if the task is extremely difficult the individual
may fail at utilizing the operation. The fourth and final step pro-
duces an individual who can use the operation successfully at all
times, regardless of the difficulty of the task.
The essence of stage theory, then, is progression through stages.
Researchers agree that individuals progress through these stages in a
certain order (Flavell, 1972; Flavell & Wohlwill, 1969; Keating, 1980;
Piaget, 1971; Pinard & Laurendreau, 1969; Rest, 1978; Selman, 1974),
but they also raise many questions about this progression.
Is a change in stage gradual or sudden? Herbert Klausmeier and
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Patricia Allen (1978), in a longitudinal study of cognitive development,
found cognitive change orderly and progressive; but others, such as
Deanna Kuhn (1979), maintain that we do not yet know.
If an individual progresses to a different stage, do the operations
of the previous stage remain operable? Piaget would say that the inte-
gration of a previous stage into a new stage is essential (Pinard &
Laurendreau, 1969), but Flavell (1972) has postulated five different
ways in which cognitive developmental sequences can be related.
If an individual moves to a new stage in one area does he move
to a new stage in other areas simultaneously? Research into the area
of simultaneous cognitive restructuring has produced a variety of results
(Gibbs, 1978; Keating & Clark, 1980; Martorano, 1977; Ribaupierre 6f
Pascal-Leone, 1979). Deanna Kuhn's assertion that synchronous changes
imply a "single underlying reorganization in cognitive structure"
(1979c, p. 40) parallels Walker and Richards' statement about the
central assumption of stage theory. They maintain that "a central
assumption of the cognitive-developmental approach is structural
parallelism—that there is a fundamental unity of development among
various domains of thought" (1979, p. 95).
The question of synchronous development relates directly to
another question in stage theory. Can an individual be taught a new
stage or at least the operations required for a new stage? Several
researchers have provided evidence that children can be taught opera-
tions, at least at the concrete level (Brainerd, 1979a; Murray, 1979).
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Deanna Kuhn, on the other hand, has found that, although some growth
may be stimulated (Kuhn & Angelev, 1976), a new structure that is
taught will become unavailable to the subject unless it is used contin-
^3.11y . Furthermore, Kuhn (1979c) has found that even if a new structure
is taught, it can be applied only in a specific situation and cannot be
generalized
.
The area of greatest contention in stage theory, with particular
reference to Piaget, has to do with the acquisition or lack thereof
of the fourth stage—that of formal operations. Considerable agree-
ment exists that passage through the first three stages (sensory-motor,
pre-operational, and concrete operational) is widespread and not
culture-specific. There is, however, little agreement about formal
operations. Some researchers have arrived at varying percentages of
adolescents and adults who have attained formal operations (Broughton,
1979; Danner & Day, 1977; Dulit, 1979; Neimark, 1975; Webb, 1974).
Other scholars have argued that adults may reason formally in areas
they are familiar with, yet not perform successfully on the Inhelder
tasks (Blasi & Hoeffel, 1974; Broughton, 1979; Gilligan & Murphy, 1979;
Kuhn, 1979c; Piaget, 1971). Still others maintain that formal opera-
tions is not universal and may be specific to the western scientific
and intellectual tradition (Buck-Morss, 1975; Elkind, 1979; Kuhn, 1978,
1979c; Morgan, 1978; Mosher, 1979; Ross, 1974).
16
The Early Adolescent
Despite the lack of agreement over who attains formal operations
or what formal operations actually is or are (as Deanna Kuhn pointed
out in 1978, part of the difficulty with assessing formal operations
is that we have no real working definition of it), research shows that
changes in cognitive development are age-related and that a qualita-
tively significant shift in thought occurs somewhere around the ages
of ten to fifteen (Adelson, 1971; Bereiter, Hidi & Dimitroff, 1979;
Blasi & Hoeffel, 1974; Broughton, 1979; Damon, 1977; Group for the
Advancement of Psychiatry, 1968; Kagan, 1971; Keating, 1979, 1980;
Keating & Clark, 1979; Kohlberg & Gilligan, 1971; Kuhn, 1978; Neimark,
1975; Yudin, 1967). This shift in thought is accompanied by qualitative
shifts in affective and physical development as well (Group for the
Advancement of Psychiatry, 1968; Protinsky, 1975).
Changes in physical development, with the exception of brain
growth, can be observed by simply looking at the population of a junior
high school. The range in sizes and shapes of this age group is extra-
ordinary because, although all early adolescents change, they do so at
different rates and at different times. At some point, a young adoles-
cent suddenly grows taller. Secondary sex characteristics become
obvious. A voluminous appetite accompanies an increase in energy level.
This physical development parallels emotional change. The early adoles-
cent can be cheerful one minute and sullen the next. The early adoles-
cent can be sophisticated and mature one day and the next more like a
17
little child. These physical and emotional changes mark the adolescent's
beginning separation from childhood and beginning entrance to the pre—
adult world (Bios, 1970, 1971; Elkind, 1967, 1978; Epstein & Conrad,
1978; Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, 1976; Kagan, 1971;
Martin, 1971; Tanner, 1971).
Piagetian-based Research
Intellectual growth is an important part of this process of change
as the early adolescent leaves childhood. As Piaget explained, the
child goes from being able to see things from his own point of view
only (egocentrism) to being able to see things from other's points of
view (decentration) . This process also involves going from taking a
concrete view of the world to taking a more abstract view of the world.
A myriad of researchers have examined different aspects of this shift
with either direct or indirect reference to the work of Piaget.
Perhaps one of the best known of these researchers is La\^^rence
Kohlberg, who investigated moral development. Kohlberg presented sub-
jects with a series of dilemmas for which they suggested appropriate
action. Kohlberg found that these appropriate actions could be coded
as representative of different levels of moral development. He also
found that subjects tended to fall into levels in an age-related manner
and that older subjects gave more abstract responses. Based on his
research, Kohlberg asserted that adolescent emotional development is
linked directly to the "universal cognitive stages of Piaget"
(Kohlberg & Gilligan, 1971, p. 1061) and stated that normal development
18
has a basic cognitive-structural component.
Other research has affirmed Kohlberg's basic tenets. Walker
found, in his efforts to stimulate moral reasoning development, that
the stage of cognitive development of the subjects was an "important
variable" (1979, p. 101). Rest and Dawson, supporting the concept of
stage theory, found that definite changes in moral judgment do take
place over the long term (1978) . Despite this research, however,
considerable controversy remains over Kohlberg’s stages about a variety
of concerns including, among others, permanence and application in real
life situations. Is a level, once attained, permanent or do individ-
uals regress as Holstein suggests in his study of college students
(1976)? Does the solving of a dilemma in a story situation accurately
reflect the actual moral judgment of the subject? Regardless, however,
of one's acceptance of the precision of Kohlberg's stages, it does seem
fairly clear that moral judgment does change as a child gets older and
that it does take on a more abstract quality.
Related to moral development is the development of concepts of
political authority and law. Joseph Adelson and Lynnette Beall (1971)
,
investigating concepts of law, found that young adolescents personalize
the processes and institutions of society, but that, as they get older
and develop abstractness in their thought, they achieve a capacity for
ideology. Early adolescents, they found, have bits and pieces of
knowledge of political systems but no understanding of the concepts
involved and no intellectual system to tie their knowledge together.
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Beall, further analyzing Adelson’s data, found that young children
view authority as personal; that among early adolescents, 85% prefer
authoritarian modes of control, but that by the ages of fifteen only
15% prefer authoritarian modes (Adelson, 1971) . Further evidence of
the early adolescent’s preference for the authoritarian mode for
clearly stated information is evident in the research of Parsons
(1979). She found that abstract art with its attendant ambiguities
was much less popular with early adolescents than it was with either
younger or older subjects.
Further study of concepts of law and justice by Leigel shows a
development of abstraction similar to that identified by Adelson and
Beall. Leigel asked a number of children of different ages what they
thought about the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King. She focussed
on asking them, specifically what should happen to the assassin. Her
results reinforced the work of others, indicating that young children's
concepts of political processes and institutions are personalized.
She concluded that development of understanding of law and increasing
depersonalization of events and motives represent growth of the child's
ability to form abstractions about the political process (1977, p. 285).
Similar evidence of this abstraction appears in the work of Coltham,
(1960) who found—when investigating the concept of kings and queens
with British school children—that young children represented them as
simply kings and queens, whereas older subjects represented them as
symbolic of the government and its structure (cited in Jahoda, 1963).
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The increasing level of abstraction can also be seen in the study
of wickedness conducted by Pringle and Gooch (1966) . These researchers
identified four stages as a child progressed from a personal to an
abstract view of what is wicked. At stage 1, up to the age of nine,
the researchers found that wicked deeds consisted of small personal
acts that the child had been taught were wrong. A child wouldn't
generalize and say stealing was wrong, but rather would list things
that shouldn't be stolen. Stage 2 children, nine and ten, began to
generalize, but wicked acts were conventional and impersonal. Stage 3
children, they found, aged 11 to 13, took a distant view of the world,
projecting rather than participating, citing crimes such as piracy or
smuggling. Stage 4 subjects demonstrated increased perspective or
world view. They also began to consider offenses within their contexts
and to consider hypocrisy and selfishness wicked. Older children began
to see a psychological dimension in wickedness.
This study of Pringle and Gooch—though rigid in its age state-
ments and a bit fuzzy in its terminology—does demonstrate, as children
grow older, both the increasing abstraction of children as they grow
older of the research previously discussed and increased perspective-
taking. Clearly, all early adolescents do at some point become capable
of thought that is more abstract through a qualitative shift in their
thinking processes. This abstractness is accompanied by a decentration
of thought. Although any analysis of the shift in adolescent thought,
of necessity, encompasses both abstraction and decentration, some
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researchers have particularly emphasized the latter.
Those who have emphasized the decentering of children's thinking
have been primarily interested in how a child learns about his social
environment. A number of people have investigated the development of
the concept of friendship, and they have found that, as children get
older, psychological aspects of friendship become more important than
physical aspects, such as proximity or sharing a toy. Youniss, for
example, found that older children are apt, when asked to describe
friendship, to tell a story of someone helping someone (Damon, 1977).
Selman was able to create a chart delineating stages of friendship and
maintains that at level 3, the mutual or third person level, psycholog-
ical support is the key to friendship (Damon, 1977; Selman, 1974).
Bigelow also observed this increasingly psychological and abstract
expectation of friends. A stage 1 child expects a friend to be close
by and to engage in similar activities. A stage 2 child expects friends
to follow social norms, but a stage 3 child requires empathy, under-
standing and self-disclosure from friends (Bigelow, 1977). Thus, as
the child grows older he increases in the ability to take another's
point of view, to see things from another's perspective, and thus
empathize with him; he, then, expects empathy in return.
Evidence of increase in perspective-taking abilities appears in
areas other than friendship. Selman has found a direct parallel between
perspective-taking ability and Kohlberg's levels of moral development
(see chart, 1976, p. 309). Turiel's work investigating attitudes
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toward social conventions also indicates increased perspective-taking
ability. Turiel found that by the ages of 14 to 16 children take what
he calls a "collectivist perspective" and consider social conventions
as important for the preservation of society (Damon, 1977, p. 237).
Damon has investigated a variety of developmental areas, justice,
sharing, leadership, authority and obedience and in all cases found that
social knowledge develops in a "predictable, age-related manner"
(1977, p. 332). He attributes the progressions children make, at least
partly, to their increasing ability to distinguish themselves from
groups of which they are a part and relate their group to other groups.
He connects this perspective-taking ability to the development of
abstract thought by asserting that the adolescent must construct new
and more comprehensive organizing principles because of his changing
perspective; childhood social knowledge is no longer adequate. Feffer
and Gorevitch also found a positive correlation between perspective-
taking ability and performance on cognitive tasks (1960)
.
A recent study of ethnocentrism (Metz, 1980) further establishes
the relationship between decentration and the development of abstract
thought. Metz investigated the desociocentering of children— that is,
the ability of children to relate empathetically to groups of which
they are not members. She found that younger children think their own
group is superior to other groups, even though they are not exactly sure
what their own group is. Older children begin to distinguish their
group from others— first, concretely (color or location) and then
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abstractly—personality traits or political issues.
Metz provided a detailed analysis of the process of desociocenter—
ing which she divided into four stages. As the child moves through
these stages he increases in both perspective-taking ability and degree
of abstraction of concepts he refers to. At the fourth stage, which
Metz terms "Reciprocity of social groups," the child can completely
empathize with another group. Based on this ability, Metz concludes
that the "coordination of distinctions and commonalities between kin-
ship, economic, or belief system of one’s own group with that of other
groups would be an example of the phenomenon of desociocentering at
the formal operational level" (p. 13).
Although other researchers have been less concerned with formal
operations, the development of abstract thought as a correlative of age
is a persistent theme. As Neimark reports (1975), studies of analogies,
of proverb interpretations, and of verbal comprehension all demon-
strated increasing abstraction, organization* and comprehension as sub-
jects moved from childhood to adolescence. Other changes in adolescent
thought accompany this increasing abstraction. Bereiter, Hidi and
Dimitroff (1979) found that children change their reasoning strate-
gies from the ages of 7 to 13, gradually coming less intuitive and
more deductive. They further found that older children are much less
apt to give premature responses and to include irrelevant data.
Additional evidence of the abstraction of adolescent thought ap-
pears in the work of Elkind and Baronas (1969) who found that adolescents
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produce many more concepts than children. They attribute this to the
adolescent's greater ability to combine stimuli and found concept
production particularly rich when object labels, as opposed to objects
themselves, were used as stimuli. Younger children, they noted, could
form concepts only at the functional and perceptual levels, whereas
adolescents could also form concepts at the categorical level—such as,
"objects for the home."
Time and History Research
From the above research, there can be no doubt that a qualitative
shift takes place during early adolescence, which involves greater
perspective— taking ability as well as increasing ability to create and
understand abstractions. Both of these qualities appear in the little
research that has investigated concepts of time or history in adoles-
cents. The only study specifically concerned with the development of a
concept of time demonstrates increasing abstraction with age.
Michaud (1949, as cited in Fraisse, 1963, pp. 277-280) asked chil-
dren between the ages of 10 and 15 what happens to time when we put the
clocks forward an hour in the spring and jump suddently from 11:00 P.M.
to midnight. He asked them if they got older. He found that the an-
swers could be classed in four main categories. First were those for
whom time was a real quantity. These children think that time is used up
and that, therefore, they actually have grown older. The second group
view the matter practically and regret the hour they have lost, but
do not consider anything further about it. The third group approach
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the problem mathematically and point out that they will gain the hour
when the clocks are put back. The fourth group realize that clock time
is imposed on them and that they do not age. Examination of Table 1
summarizing the results Indicates the older a child is the greater are
the chances that his concept of time will be abstract.
Table 1
Relationship of Age to Abstract Time Concept
NUMBER
OF
CHILDREN AGE
TIME =
REAL
QUANTITY
%
TIME =
ACTIVITY
%
TIME =
MATHEMATICAL
PROBLEM
%
TIME =
CONVENTION
%
247 10 36.8 36 2 19.8
336 11 32.1 33.3 2 29.7
478 12 22.5 25.7 3.1 39.1
459 13 16.5 22.4 5 47.7
219 14 16.4 11.7 10.3 56.8
59 15 10.1 6.7 23.7 59.3
In addition to demonstrating increasing abstraction, Michaud’s study
illustrates the confusion children have about the concept of time.
Michaud’s work represents the only study of the acquisition of time
concepts of children of this age. Piaget (1927) and others have investi-
gated concepts of time in younger children, but no research exists that
explores the concepts of time in children beginning to develop abstract
thought
.
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Research into historical concepts is equally limited, though that
which does exist demonstrates that, as children grow older, they gain
more abstract notions of history and seem to have a wider perspective.
F. Jahoda (1963), in the only synthesis of research related to time and
historic concept development, presented 34 studies of varying degrees
of sophistication demonstrating concreteness in young children and
abstraction in older. Oakden and Sturt (1922, cited in Jahoda, 1963)
demonstrated that children cannot establish relationships between histor-
ical events and immediate family relationships. They further illus-
trated that children cannot, until at least the age of 11, tell when
one event occurred in relation to two other events when given the dates.
Pistor (1939, cited in Jahoda, 1963) demonstrates lack of historical
perspective in children and the inability of children to be taught
historical concepts. Additional studies found that students began to
develop a sense of historical perspective about the age of 13 or 14
(Roth, 1955, cited in Jahoda, 1963), but some suggest that full under-
standing of history is not attained until at least the age of sixteen
(Flickinger and Rehage, 1949; Hunter, 1934; both cited in Jahoda, 1963).
Based on the research available to him, Jahoda attempted a synthe-
sis by creating a table of "Stage in the Development of Concepts of
Time and History" (see Table 2, p. 27; from Jahoda, p. 101). This table
demonstrates, as one would expect, that with maturation comes an
increased abstractness of thought and a greater perspective-taking
ability. It is interesting to note that, although Jahoda wrote his
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Table 2
Stages in the Development of Concepts of Time and History
Approximate
Chronological
Age
Past which can be
present in mind
and produce
effect
Present as time
actively employed
Anticipated future
modifying present
act ion
Notions of time and
history and progres-
sion of historical
interest
5/6 yrs. Yesterday Today
7/8 yrs.
9/10 yrs.
Last week
A month ago
This day
This month
10/11 yrs. In the spring This summer
Pre-adoles- Last year This year
cence
This period
of life
Tomorrow Mythological Time:
Unfolding in the imagi-
nation; tales and
stories.
("Once upon a time.")
In a week
In 30 days Objective Time and
possibility of control
("I'll ask my grand-
father if it is true");
some like the story to
be true, others not.
In winter Continguity of Past
with Present. Things
valued because of
their age; respect for
ancient monuments
—
proud to collect old
souvenirs, to commem-
orate the present
(photos, etc.) for when
"one gets old."
Next year Historical Continuity.
Interest in historical
sequences develops in
following order: bio-
logical, (seed, plant,
harvest); technical
(ships, engines); and
cultural (period of
stage coaches. Bronze
age. )
Historical Milieu.
Isolated, realistic
details placed in
their historical frame-
work (interest in
museums), historical
tales and novels.
Historical Progress.
Continuous development
of one person or
period
.
Beginnings of Historical
Interpretation.
Psychological motives
of past actions.
Ado lescence Five years ago
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3-rticle in. 1963, most of the research he cites dates from the forties,
some from the twenties, and only one source, an unpublished doctoral
dissertation from the University of Manchester, from as recently as
1960. No research has been done since Jahoda's review that relates to
concepts of time and history in early adolescents.
More recent research has been almost totally concerned with
orientation toward the future and does show, as one would expect, a
change in perspective with age. Research by Thomas J. Cottle (1969, 1970)
and Peggy Jo Wagner in the future time perspectives of young adoles-
cents reveals that older adolescents think farther into the future than
younger ones. Cottle (1969) also found that young adolescents have
less concern with historical events and less awareness of the relation-
ships between the past, present, and future than older adolescents.
Peggy Jo Wagner (1975) also found increased past time perspective, which
she attributed to general cognitive development.
The general development of abstract time concepts relates to
maturation, as does the development of other abstract concepts. Develop-
ment of abstract time concepts, however, also appears to be related to
other variables not considered here—such as social class (Lehan, 1952,
cited in Fraisse, 1963; Lessing, 1972, education (Fraisse, 1963);
culture (Bray, 1970, Shannon, 1975); and self-concept (Tehan, 1958,
reported in Fraisse, 1963). Lessing (1972), for example, found by
testing working-class and middle-class girls, ages 9-11 and 12-15, that
working-class 9-11, 12-15 year-olds and middle-class 9-11 year-olds had
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similar future time perspectives in relation to cognitive motivation,
but that middle~ class 12—15 year-olds had significantly longer future
time perspective in relation to cognitive motivation. She further
found, corroborating Cottle’s research, that younger children envision-
ed a longer future than older children and attributed this to the
older children’s closeness to milestone events and realistic attitudes
toward their own futures.
The connection between social class, self-concept, achievement in
school, and time perspective was also observed by Wagner. Her work
implies an achievement orientation in relation to development of time
perspective, and this is borne out both in studies which find that
youngsters with good self-concepts do better in schools and in cross-
cultural studies. Shannon (1975), for example, has found that Mexican
Americans do not do well in American schools partially because their
time orientation is different and the routine of the American high
school does not fit into their time constructions. Also, Bray (1970),
in a study of Maori and European New Zealanders, found that the latter
have a longer future time orientation and also show a greater tendency
to delay gratification.
Conclusion
Concepts of time and history, though universal, vary from culture
to culture. Non-Western cultures tend to view time as circular and
history as mythic. Western cultures, on the other hand, view time and
history as history as linear and progressive. The Western view of time
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and history generated the scientific rationalist tradition of know-
ledge on which Jean Piaget bases his genetic epistemology.
All recent research about the construction of knowledge builds
on the work of Jean Piaget. This research can be divided into three
general areas which overlap considerably. Some scholars have analyzed
Piaget's work from a theoretical standpoint, considering the validity
of stages, arguing about the internal consistency or inconsistency
of the formal operational stage or creating elaborate mathematical
formulae to diagram the relationship of one thought to another. These
studies have been based on narrow interpretations of Piaget's work;
and, although interesting philosophically, they have not told us much
about the development of knowledge in children and adolescents.
A second group of researchers has replicated the studies done
by Piaget. These investigators have administered Piagetian tasks
to a wide range of populations to determine at what ages the subjects
can do certain tasks such as conserve volume. Some of these research-
ers have tried to determine if and when a child goes from concrete
to formal operational thought. Scholars have shown, usefully to be
sure, that nearly all children go through t he first three stages but
that the fourth stage, that of formal operations, may be culture-
specific and may not be attained by everyone. Nonetheless, these
studies falter, limited by the tasks themselves as well as by the lack
of consistency from study to study. In some cases the descriptions of
the subjects are limited. Generally, the studies use different methods
of scoring and analysis, so comparison of one study to another is
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difficult.
A third group of scholars has sought to broaden the study of
thinking by investigating aspects of thought not isolated by the use
of Piagetian tasks. These researchers have devised dilemmas or story
situations to which children respond. Based on these responses, the
researchers have established levels demonstrating increased abstrac-
tion or greater decentration as the child gets older. I'Jhile these
studies add to our knowledge of early adolescent thought, they limit
our view by their methods, which give the subjects a set of situations
or dilemmas from which they choose appropriate responses. In some
studies, the subject chooses the best of four responses; in other cases,
the subject states the response. Research, obviously, is limited by
the dilemma itself and by the artificiality of the testing situation.
The response a child makes to a story dilemma may not be the response
he would make when faced with that same dilemma in real life.
Despite the limitations of research into children’s thinking, we
do know much more about child thought now than we did when Piaget
began his work in 1922. Now we know that knowledge is acquired by
progression through age-related stages, and now we know that emotional
and social development are related to overall cognitive development.
We also know that early adolescents become capable of more abstract
thought and have greater ability to comprehend another’s viewpoint.
There have, however, been no studies that ask students to respond
freely to open-ended questions. Hence, we know little about their
actual constructs.
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Perhaps we need to go back to children, as Piaget began sixty
years ago, and find out what they think. Perhaps we need to find out
how they construct knowledge about a particular concept without the
restrictions implicit in presenting situations to the subject. Unques-
tionably, there is a real need for new data, for data elicited direct-
ly from children's minds. In the sixty years since Piaget began his
investigations of children's thinking, there has been little research
that directly asks for a child's construction of an idea or a concept.
To gain greater insight into the development of adolescent thinking,
we need to begin gathering some constructs from these adolescents.
This study begins that process by gathering constructs of time and
history from seventh- through twelfth-graders. By doing this, this
study begins to fill a gap in the literature in two areas. It provides
some insight into the early adolescents' constructions of knowledge,
and it furnishes information about the acquisition of concepts of time
and history.
CHAPTER III
METHOD
Design
This study investigated constructs of time and history of public
junior and senior high school students in a small university town in
New England. Two hundred and fifty—six students, representing each
grade and level in the school, responded to a questionnaire designed
to elicit individual thoughts and ideas about time and history.
Seventeen of these students from grades 7, 8, and 9 participated in
follow-up interviews.
The questionnaires were administered in the fall and again in the
spring to provide data about whether student constructs of time and
history change during the year. The questionnaires also allowed com-
parisons by grade and level. The interviews following each question-
naire administration gave students a chance to elaborate on the items
in the questionnaire and provided the researcher with an opportunity
to probe into students’ understanding of how their ideas had changed.
The broad and exploratory nature of this study resulted in data analy-
sis that was primarily qualitative and descriptive.
Subjects
The subjects of this study were 256 students enrolled in a regional
public junior-senior high achool with a total enrollment of 1800
students in a small university town in New England. Students in this
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school system are grouped for instructional purposes, according to
achievement, in three levels: basic, standard, and advanced. Basic
students generally need remedial work in reading and writing skills.
Standard students are considered average in skill development, whereas
advanced students are expected to be, in addition to skilled readers
and writers, highly motivated. Students in grades seven through nine
are also grouped by grade for instruction. Hence a student might be
in seventh-grade basic social studies or ninth-grade standard. In
grades ten through twelve, however, students are grouped primarily
by level, and hence classes frequently have students from all three
grades at the same level, for example, advanced.
Subjects for this study were selected by identifying one social
studies class to represent each grade and level. A total of thirteen
classes was identified. To make sure that a full range of psycholog-
ical abilities was represented, the sample for this study contained a
higher percentage of students at the basic and advanced levels than
was present in the total student body. Two hundred and fifty-six
students, representing different levels of cognitive achievement, pro-
vided the subjects for this study. Table 3 summarizes the classes
and the number of students in each.
The differences in subject numbers in grades seven, eight, and
nine in fall and spring can be explained by student absences and
possibly an occasional schedule change. Students in these grades
usually stay with the same class all year. In grades ten, eleven, and
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TABLE 3
Distribution of Subjects
Achievement
Levels
Basic Standard Advanced
1 Number of Number of Number of
1
Classes Students Classes Students Classes Students
Grades
&
Month
7 Dec
.
1 13 1 25 1 21
7 May 1 13 1 24 1 24
8 Dec. 1 9 1 26 1 21
8 May 1 8 1 23 1 23
9 Dec. 1 12 1 23 1 24
9 May 1 15 1 22 1 25
10-12 Dec. 1 16 2 42 1 24
10-12 May d . n . a
.
5 d.n. a.
1
24 d.n. a. 20
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twelve, however, the situation is different. Because high school
students have major schedule changes at the beginning of the second
semester, it is difficult to maintain a full pool of subjects. Stu-
dents from first-semester classes are scattered in a wide variety of
different classes second semester, so each subject must be individually
located and surveyed. As a result, despite the efforts of the high
school questionnaire administrators, only 49 of the original 82 high
school students completed the questionnaire a second time. Because
the focus of this study is on grades seven, eight, and nine, the
researcher does not consider the reduction in high school subjects
significant for the purposes of this study.
From the 256 subjects who responded to the December questionnaire,
17 seventh, -eighth, -and ninth- graders were selected for follow-up
interviews. Since the quality of interview data depends, in large
part, on the "subject's ability and willingness to report," volunteers,
particularly those identified by teachers as verbally fluent, were
interviewed wherever possible (Clinard, 1967; Vidich, 1955, p. 170).
Social studies teachers asked for interview volunteers from each class
when the class first filled out the questionnaire. In cases where
too many subjects volunteered, teachers recommended subjects based on
the volunteer's verbal ability. In cases where there were no volun-
teers, teachers asked students to participate. Of the seventeen sub-
jects interviewed following the first questionnaire administration,
thirteen were interviewed again following the second administration of
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the questionnaire. The interview subjects were distributed throughout
the total sample, as shown in the following table:
Table 4
Distribution of Interview Subjects
Grade Basic Standard Advanced
Boy Girl Boy Girl Boy Girl
7 1st inter. 1 1 1 1 1
2nd inter. 1 1 1 1 1
8 1st inter. 1 1 1 2 1
2nd inter. 1 2 1
9 1st inter. 1 1 1 1 1 1
2nd inter. 1 1 1 1
/
Initially the researcher had intended to interview high school stu-
dents as well; but preliminary examination of the questionnaire
responses, as well as the richness of the data provided by interview
subjects in grades seven, eight, and nine, indicated that high school
interview data would not be needed.
Instruments
This study used two instruments, a questionnaire for the survey
of all subjects and an interview schedule for the first interviews.
The questionnaire was developed over a period of fourteen months.
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The questionnaire development began with broad, tentative explorations
of the problem to be studied. As feedback was received, items on the
questionnaire were weeded out, honed, and refined until they produced
data that were significant to the study (Becker, 1957; Whiting, 1970).
The first questionnaire, given to a small group of seventh,
-
eighth, -and ninth-graders in the fall of 1979, demonstrated that these
students definitely differed in their constructs of time and history.
Because of the differences demonstrated in this initial exploration,
the study of constructs of time and history appeared worth investi-
gating. Consequently, the initial questionnaire was refined for use
in this study, going through six modifications during its fourteen
months of development. During this development process, items devel-
oped by the researcher, as well as some used in previous time studies
or present in the Educational Testing Service Microfiche tests, were
introduced and evaluated. Questions about individuals' use of time
and schedules were rejected as being judgmental and suggestive of
"correct" answers for subsequent items. A chart asking subjects to
list the ten most important events of their lives, intended to supply
data about length of time perspective, did not produce useful data
and was therefore eliminated. Items asking subjects to define "the
past," "long ago," and "the future" produced vague, repetitive, insig-
nificant data. Question that required knowledge of specific histor-
ical events were rejected as not germane to the study and, perhaps,
definitions of terms such as "decade"leading. Questions requiring
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and "century" were also rejected as not germane to the study. During
the process of questionnaire development, the researcher concluded
that asking specific knowledge questions was Incongruent with trying
to cause subjects to articulate their own individual constructs of
time and history.
During the process of questionnaire development, each successive
version was administered to ten to twenty young people. Analysis of
their responses to see what questions provided significant data and
interviews of the respondents about the questionnaire suggested the
changes that eventually led to the questionnaire used in the study
(Appendix A). During the pilot stage of questionnaire development,
approximately 100 young people, ages eight to eighteen, responded to
the questionnaire. Furthermore, school administrators, teachers, and
other professionals associated with education reviewed the question-
naire and made suggestions.
The questionnaire used in this study consists of thirteen open-
ended questions relating to constructs of time and history. The
subjects were asked to define the present, to state what time is,
and to tell how much time they can imagine. They were asked to indi-
cate historical events and issues that mean something to them and state
what, if anything, these events and issues have to do with them. In
addition, they were asked to indicate whether or not they fit in the
history of the United States and the world, and, if so, how. Finally,
there was opportunity for students to make any comments they wished
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about time and history.
The interview schedule, developed from analysis of responses on
the questionnaire after its first administration, was designed to
solicit data that would augment and amplify, with rich descriptive
detail, the data from the questionnaire (Appendix B)
. Most questions
were designed to see what the subject knew about how or why his ideas
of time and history developed and changed. Such questions as "What
do you think you thought time was when you were little?" or "Has the
change in your ideas of time affected you in any way?" encouraged
the subject to compare his changing perspectives.
The last section of the schedule was intended to trigger recall
of previous interactions of the subject with time or history by such
tentative questions as, "I*m curious; do you, does anyone in your
family, ever talk about your grandparents, ancestors, things like that?"
and "Are there in your family any kinds of celebrations that you know
the background of?" The interview schedule, though it served as a
guide for the researcher and though it contained a few items all
subjects responded to, was only a guide; and, as in a "guided conver-
sation," less important in determing the direction of the interview
than remarks made by the subject (Douglas, 1976; Lofland, 1971, p. 76).
The second interview, which followed the second administration
of the questionnaire, required no schedule as its intent was simply to
elicit the subjects’ opinions about the responses they had made on the
questionnaires. The researcher first asked the subject if he thought
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there was any difference between the responses he made in December and
those he made in May. After the subject replied to this question, the
subject read the two questionnaires and commented on similarities and
differences in the responses. The researcher encouraged elaboration
by supportive and questioning responses.
Procedure
Once this study was designed and the questionnaire developed,
the actual conducting of the research involved several steps. First,
the school system was contacted and permission obtained to conduct
the study. Secondly, classes for the study were identified and the
individual teachers who would be administering the questionnaires
were informed of the research. Third, parents of subjects were noti-
fied and parents of potential interviewees were contacted for written
permission for their child's participation. Lastly, the logistics of
times and places for questionnaire administration and interviews were
arranged.
The researcher experienced no difficulty in obtaining school
system consent for this study. Having taught in the social studies
department of this system for ten years, the researcher was familiar
with both the policies and the personnel of the system. Curricular
supervisors and department heads were interested in and supportive
of the proposed research study. The questionnaire itself does not
contain controversial material and its content fit easily with that
of the social studies classes where it would be administered.
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Teacher-colleagues who were to administer the questionnaire proved
cooperative and helpful.
After establishing the necessary permissions and contacts, the
researcher met both individually and in small groups with the seven
teachers who would administer the questionnaire. These meetings,
intended to assure as much consistency as possible in questionnaire
administration, provided teachers with detailed instructions for the
administration of the questionnaire. They also explained the re-
searcher's interest in the study and why it was being done. They
provided a chance for teachers to ask questions about the study and to
offer helpful suggestions, which they did. These meetings also ful-
filled the important function, as Richardson (1952) points out, of
explaining to the people involved in the research not only the purpose
of the research but how and why their help is needed. Finally, the
meetings permitted the working out of logistics—such as how the
questionnaires would be delivered to the appropriate classrooms, who
would assure their return to the researcher, and other critical details.
The first administration of the questionnaire took place during
the second week of December when social studies teachers administered
the questionnaire during a single class period to all the students in
that class. After explaining the intent of the research, teachers
handed out the questionnaires. They then read the directions to the
students while the students followed them on their questionnaire.
Students had an opportunity to ask questions and to clear up any
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misunderstandings they might have about the questionnaire. Teachers
assured students that there were no right or wrong answers and that
we were interested in what each individual thought, that each person's
ideas were important.
Following the first administration of the questionnaire, the
researcher developed the interview schedule, began contacting potential
interviewees, obtained written parental permission, and set up individ-
ual interview appointments. Interviews were scheduled depending upon
the class schedule of the subjects and the teaching schedule of the
researcher. Interviews lasted between 15 and 45 minutes.
During the interviews, the researcher established a relaxed,
friendly environment. When the subject arrived, the researcher made
sure, in a low-key fashion, that the subject understood the point of
the research and why his or her statements would be useful. The
researcher also emphasized that anything the subject said would remain
confidential and anonymous, at the same time assuring the subject that
no embarrassing personal questions would be asked.
During the actual interview the researcher referred to the schedule
but quickly abandoned note-taking. Since the interviews were being re-
corded, note- taking was unnecessary and seemed to create a psychological
distance between the interviewer and the subject by changing the focus
from the subject to the paper being written on and by breaking eye
contact. Furthermore, the researcher found it difficult to process what
the subject was saying in order to formulate her response and the next
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question, if she was also writing. Without writing, the researcher was
able to concentrate on what the subject was saying, on how to respond
in a way that would bring out more data, and on trying to make sure that
each question followed logically from the previous response of the sub-
ject so that no questions would be a complete surprise to the subject
After the interview was completed, the interviewer asked for any
comments the subject might like to make on either the topic or the
questions to see if changes were necessary to make questions clearer.
The researcher thanked the interviewee and explained the procedure for
the rest of the study. Between the first and second interviews, the
researcher consciously maintained friendly relations with the interview
subjects by addressing them by name in the halls and in general being
aware of them (Douglas, 1976; Mann, 1951).
The scheduling of seventeen interviews within the context of a
large public junior high school presented some difficulties. Space had
to be found, a tape recorder arranged for, and student schedules syn-
chronized with that of the researcher, a full-time teacher. Because
of these difficulties, the first series of interviews stretched over
three months, from February to April.
Following the completion of the first set of interviews, the
researcher again contacted teachers who were to administer the question-
naire for the second time. This group of teachers contained seven from
the original pool in addition to four new ones, due to teacher assign-
ments and schedule changes. Explanations were made and questions
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answered as necessary, and the questionnaire was administered during the
third week of May.
Following this administration, interview appointments were again
set up, interviews conducted and taped. This last set of interviews,
conducted from June to July, represented the final stage of data collec-
tion as articulated in the research design. The researcher did,
however, conclude these interviews with a comment to the subject that
she might want to interview them again. This provided easv access to
them if more data should be needed during data analysis.
Data Analysis
Data analysis required two approaches: coding and transcription.
Responses to questionnaire items were coded to provide quantitative
information about types of response relative to grade, sex, level, and
season. Interviews were transcribed to provide data in an immediately
accessible form and then examined for particularly rich observations
about time and history. For data presentation, the quantitative results
of the study provided a background for the more significant descrip-
tive discussion of early adolescent constructs of time and history.
Responses to the questionnaire were coded along a continuum from
concrete to abstract. The three main categories
—
concrete
,
transitional—
and abstract—used in this study parallel those used by other researchers
studying early adolescent development. The change in time constructs
parallels perspective changes observed by Piaget and Inhelder (1958)
as a young person goes from an egocentric viewpoint through decentration
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or the ability to understand others’ points of view. Similarly, in
his studies of perspective-taking, Selman (1974, 1976) observed gradual
broadening of viewpoint. Adelson (1971), Damon (1977), Elkind (1967,
1974, 1978), Kohlberg (1971, 1972), and Metz (1980) are others who have
noted the gradually increasing ability of developing adolescents to see
themselves in relation to the rest of the world. This same increase in
perspective appears in students' changing constructs of time and history.
As these constructs are examined, general characteristics of
thought can be used to analyze questionnaire responses and categorize
them as concrete, transitional, or abstract. Concrete included those
marked by immediacy, by reference to a particular, often personal, sit-
uation or event. Concrete contained an egocentric point of view and/
or considered the situation only from the perspective of the subject.
These responses showed no concern for general social welfare. In gen-
eral, concrete responses can be defined as those in which the individual
indicates a world centered on self and immediate surroundings. Further-
more, these responses mention only one variable and do not show the
flexibility of thought possessed by those who can manipulate several
sets of data at once.
Many responses on the questionnaire were categorized as transi-
tional. As others who have examined transitional, or preformal, or
early formal thought have found, responses of students in transition
from concrete to formal operations exhibit elements of both concrete
and abstract thought. The subject refers to self, but also articulates
a connection between self and the rest of the world. A sociocentric
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viewpoint is developing as an overlay to the egocentric viewpoint.
The subject is still dependent on immediate and known experience but
sees it in a broader context that frequently allows the subject to
make generalizations. In short, the transitional response is charac-
terized by the ability to take a broad view of things, but only when
anchored in the safety of a personal experience or known event.
Abstract thought, on the other hand, demonstrates the ability to
express ideas without articulation of immediate experience, to see the
relationships between ideas instead of things. This thought is also
characterized by an awareness of others in the world and, in some
cases, a concern for larger groups and for humanity in general. Other
examiners of adolescent thought such as Yudin (1967) and Elkind (1967,
1974) have found similar concerns with humanity developing among
adolescents as these young people develop the ability, articulated by
Piaget, to imagine what could be instead of what is. Parallels are
also obvious between abstract thought as characterized here and
Selman’s social role taking stages, Metz's desociocentering, and
Jahoda's discussion of children's notion of history. Damon explains
this broadening viewpoint by pointing out that the adolescent must
construct new and more comprehensive organizing principles because
of his changing perspectives; childhood social knowledge is no longer
adequate. Early adolescents' changing constructs of time follow these
general patterns and give further evidence of the increasing richness
and complexity of thought of these young people.
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Not all responses, however, fit neatly into concrete, transitional,
and abstract categories. Some responses simply define or explain an
item, so these were considered definitions and incapable of being judged
concrete, transitional, or abstract. Evaluative responses or cliches,
such as "time is money" or "valuable" were also not categorized in
terms of level of thinking. A third type of response in this non-
category were emotional comments, such as "I love rock music." This
statement tells something about the subject but not about his level
of thinking. Unanswered items were counted because it was assumed
that if an item was not responded to, the subject did not understand it.
Although necessary to see some general trends in young people's
constructs, putting open-ended responses into categories of concrete,
transitional, and abstract is a bit like squeezing the juice out of an
orange and then examining the seeds and skin to establish the quality
of the orange. Young people's views of time and history are so
varied that lumping answers together, even with fairly clear para-
meters, automatically eliminates much of the variety in their thinking.
The subtle difference, for example, between the present as "what's
happening now" and the present as "what is happening now, today,
something already begun . . . not yet finished" disappears when these
answers are categorized as concrete and counted. And yet, when dealing
with 477 questionnaires, categorizing and counting are essential. It
is important to remember, however, that within these gross categories
exists a tremendous amount of subtle, individual variation.
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Nevertheless, this categorization does allow for some rough generali-
zations about young people's constructs at different grades and achieve-
ment levels. Some general trends in thought appear. By categorizing
the questionnaire responses and then augmenting these with examples
from the questionnaires and comments from the interviews, a picture
begins to emerge of the extraordinary richness and diversity of early
adolescent thoughts about time and history.
CHAPTER IV
CONSTRUCTS OF TIME AND HISTORY:
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Introduction
Early adolescent constructs of time and history provide diverse
data ranging from statements that time is "a clock" to statements that
time is "the only eternal force." Within these two extremes, concrete
and abstract, exist a great variety of transitional responses. In
addition to producing statements about time that permit some judgment
about the type of thinking the student is using, many students com-
mented on the difficulty they experienced trying to explain time or
divulged their attitudes toward time. Others commented on how their
ideas about time had changed or how they had learned about it in the
first place.
Although constructs of time covered a broad spectrum, constructs
of history varied little. Student explanations of historical events
and what they had to do with the student, however, covered a wide
range from "nothing" to "all events affect everybody." These
responses fit into concrete, transitional, and abstract categories,
as did student statements about how they are connected to history.
In addition to discussing their connection to history, some students
commented on whether or not they think time and history are connected
and on changes in their viewpoints.
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Data were categorized as concrete, transitional, or abstract.
Responses categorized as concrete were those based on immediacy and
reference to a physical object or what that object tells. Abstract
responses gave no articulation of a physical object and demonstrated
the subject's ability to view his or her relationship to the world
from a third-person point of view. Transitional responses fell
between these two. These responses refer to an immediate event or a
physical object, but also show the subject's awareness that he or
she is part of a group, such as a generation.
Constructs of Time
Concrete
Concrete constructs of time seem only obliquely connected to the
universal nature of time, but they clearly are connected to a physical
object. Concrete constructs of time are "a clock," the physical
object, or hours, minutes, and days"—what the physical object tells.
These concrete constructs articulate the object or what it tells
without the expression of a concept of measurement
.
Time is 9:00. Time is time.
Time is the passing of each decade, year, month,
week, day, etc., etc.
Time is the amount of minutes or hours in conjunc-
tion with the sun.
Time is when some metal things go around numbers.
Time is spring, summer, winter, fall, year after
year, day after day, hour after hour, minute
after minute, second after second.
Time is the passing hours, minutes, seconds.
Time is what the clock tells.
Such concrete constructs were created by about one-fifth of the
total sample in all grades and levels, but above grade eight concrete
responses appear in basic and standard classes only, with two excep-
tions. In advanced classes, after spring of the eighth grade only
two concrete constructs appeared.
Students, who create such concrete constructs of time or who are
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unable to construct time, also tend to view time pragmatically. When
asked if he ever thought about time, a seventh-grade boy in a standard
class replied, "Yah, like sometimes I think about what I'm going to do
in the next month or what I did last month," but he was unable to tell
what time is. "It's something that passes. I don't—it's—it's it's
just there— I don't know." An eighth-grade girl in a standard class
expressed similar difficulty and views. \^en asked what time is, she
replied, I don't know, just, I don't know. I couldn't. I know what
it is, but you can't really put it into words." For this girl, too,
time is still primarily pragmatic; she thinks about it in relation to
what she's supposed to do when and where.
Some ninth- graders
,
still fairly concrete in their thinking,
expressed similar views. A ninth-grade girl in a basic class who
said she never thought about time defined it simply as "life." She
was happy with her definition and not concerned that it was unclear.
Two other ninth-graders think about time primarily as a way of helping
them know when they have to do something—"You know, keeping time of
my appointments and things like that." Considering time pragmatically,
they demonstrate little awareness that time is more than the clock
and the schedules it helps them create. The girl said that time was
"something that can be related to place, to the past, present, and
future. It can be something like a deadline or a time to, uhm, have
to pass in something. A time like time of day, month, year, dates,
more or less." The boy defined time as "a way to keep your schedule
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pretty much; I guess that's the only thing I use It for." When asked
how he would explain it to someone who'd never heard of it, he replied
"I don't know. Ah, that's something."
Similarly, an eighth-grade girl in a standard class, although she
shows glimmers of the philosophical curiosity characteristic of transi-
tional thought, remains firmly concrete in her construct and explana-
hion of time. When I think about time, I think about how long the
world s gonna last and stuff like that. Why are there minutes and
hours and?" Her explanation, however, belies the promise of the
question for it is concrete and matter-of-fact. "Well there has to
be some time schedule." "Time," she concludes, is "minutes and hours."
Transitional
Young people who are not content with time as "a clock" or "hours,
minutes and days" begin groping for more sophisticated constructs of
time. They create transitional constructs. As they should, these
transitional constructs of time, created by about one-half of the
subjects, contain aspects of both concrete and abstract thought. The
transitional thinkers apply one variable to another. They apply the
clock or the hours and minutes of a concrete time construct to the
world and what is in it or to their own lives. These early adoles-
cents conceptualize time by thinking of it in terms of events, a unit
of measurement, a schedule, a measurement of events, and other appli-
cations of constructs of hours and minutes to the world at large.
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These transitional constructs appear to be of two main types
though they cannot be clearly delineated. The early transitional
constructs, however, show awareness that time is something more than
a clock or hours, minutes and days; but the constructs are character-
ized by lack of clarity. These early transitional constructs of time
demonstrate various elements of the complexity of time, but they are
not integrated and clear. Some of them also show the philosophical
wondering that accompanies transitional thought.
Time is the space between one event and another.
Time is past, present, furture, and clocks and
other electrical devices.
Time is the passing of happenings.
Time is a measurement of length from one point
to another, the fourth dimension.
Time is a space to do things in, or what
already happened in it
.
Time is a thing to measure the space of waiting.
Time is a concept of passing.
Time is a never ending scale.
Time is an intangible thing that exists only
through the aging of tangible things, and time
causes the aging.
Time is the fourth dimension.
Time is right now, in the past, and in the future,
time is anywhere and . . . anyhow. Time is.
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These constructs demonstrate young people trying to grasp an abstract
concept. They do not, however, state their constructs as clearly as
others, also in transition, who seem to be beginning the process of
integrating their previous concrete constructs with their newly develop-
ing abstract constructs. In contrast to the constructs above, which
seem as if the young person has rejected his concrete construct and is
groping for a more sophisticated construct, the following constructs
seem to suggest that the students have created a clearer construct of
time’s abstractness and are therefore now trying to integrate that
more abstract construct with their previous concrete construct of time.
They have not yet achieved integration of these two constructs but
appear to be working on it. They articulate the application of con-
crete constructs to the world.
A seventh-grade girl in an advanced class shows how she begins
this application by trying to relate time to the sun. "Time is," she
stated, "a measurement of how long it is from when the sun goes up till
the sun does down and just the measuring of days. I might say it's
when you do things. It can be how old you are though usually it s the
measurement. I'm twelve years old, you know." When asked if she
ever thought about time, this girl demonstrates a beginning of the
ability, characteristic of formal thought, to imagine what isn t.
Well, the other day I was thinking about what it
would be like if we didn't have clocks ... If every
one went different places at different times, then
no one would be there together and you couldn t go
to school. I mean the teachers would have to be
there all day and all night and it would be sort of
bad, I guess.
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Though firmly rooted in her own experience, this girl is beginning to
deal with multiple variables in a flexible way, but still depends on
the physical environment rather than manipulating ideas.
Other transitional constructs also relate time to variables (events)
but still need to refer to a specific concrete unit of time measurement.
"Time is moments, seconds, minutes, years, etc. It is what is before,
during, and after an event." Other examples of transitional responses
include.
Time is a way of measuring days.
Time is the schedule of seconds, minutes, hours, days
and so on, that the world is run by. It is used as a
method of recording data and keeping track of life. A
system can be primitive or advanced, but it will do the
same job.
Time is the element we use to schedule our lives around.
Time is the distance between the occurrence of events.
Time is the occurrence of events. If nothing ever
happened there would be no time.
Time is a measurement of the area between days, months,
years, etc.
Time is a way of measuring the amount of time there is.
Time is how long ago things happened, a way of recording
an exact happening.
Time is a period of events that happens in some kind of
order—of infinite space—no beginning, no end.
Transitional responses generally show students struggling to create a
satisfactory construct of time. These young people obviously are not
content with time as "a clock" or "hours, minutes, and days, but they
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have not yet constructed a concept that interrelates clock time with
the cultural construct of time in Western tradition. These constructs
attempt to grasp the notion of time in relation to the past, present,
and future, and in relation to space; but they still usually articulate
specifics, such as happenings, events, or the use of the term measuring.
Difficulties of Time Construction
The confusion engendered in the minds of these transitional
students as they try to construct time is frequently expressed. A
ninth-grade girl states, "I have no idea how to explain this." A high
school student comments that time is "a difficult concept to comprehend."
A seventh-grader informs that time is "an infinite course of which I
can comprehend but not explain." Or, as an eighth-grader, struggling
to grasp the abstract aspects of time explained, time is "an incon-
ceivable concept. If you really think about time in relation to other
things, you can get confused."
Eighth-graders, generally, more than half of whom create transi-
tional constructs, have difficulty with their constructs. They know
there's more to time than a clock, but they're not sure what. Their
comments also begin to show the philosophical overtones characteristic
of transitional thought. They wonder what life was like in the past
and how we were created. An eighth-grade boy from a standard class
who thinks about the past and how we were created has difficulty
stating a construct of time.
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Time. Let's see, time can be either past or
future. It's—some words, you know what they mean,
but you don't know what the meaning is. Uhm. I
don't know.
He then attempts a broad generalization and tries to reconcile it with
the notion of hours and minutes.
Time is everything that has happened and every-
thing that will happen. Time has happened before
It's every second, every little minute, every
hour of all day long that was and will be, like,
uhm, like from the beginning to now is a time—
a
very long time. From an hour ago to now is very
short on a scale of from the beginning to now,
and time is each second and each minute that you
can think of.
This boy obviously is struggling with some complicated notion of time
in relation to events, but is not successful at figuring out exactly
what the connection is. This statement is a particularly good example
of the confusion that can accompany transitional thought in relation
to the complex notion of time. It shows a boy attempting to reconcile
various things he knows about the world with earlier beliefs, such as
time is a clock, that no longer totally explain his new knowledge.
Another eighth-grade boy demonstrates similar confusion as he
attempts to explain the past, present, and future as well as his own
existence. As with some other students, when asked if he thinks about
time, this boy interpreted the question to mean different periods of
time.
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Yah, like a lot of the time I try to remember
things and like back in time, and also what it
would be like to be back in time. Sometimes I
wonder if I could just keep going on. Sometimes
that we have the earth . . . whatever; that we'd
become very advanced . .
.
just imagining what
it would be like to live in a different time.
Sometimes, I'd like to know how much time I have
before I die, what's going to happen afterwards,
and am I just going to be for all eternity just
there in the ground, or whatever, or am I going
to the next world, or whatever: I get really
frustrated because sometimes I ask myself, like,
why am I here and then why isn't there not just
someone else instead of me—why wasn't I a bird
and sometimes, why is there a world and why
isn't it . . . and I just keep going and going.
This boy's discussion of issues that relate to time typify adolescent
concern with idealism and trying to justify the existence of things.
He is just beginning to see the endless possibilities made available
to him by the beginning development of abstract thinking. The confusion
caused by this beginning of abstract thinking appears in his attempts
to define time.
It's sort of hard. Uhm. Time. The amount of
something or how things go on—I can't think of
exactly what I want to say. It's the amount of
something. I don't know what. It's just how
things are. I can't, it's something, but I don't
know what. Well, it's something to go by but
that's not—it's just like as in a clock and
everything. The way to know things are and how.
Time. There I go again and how events go on.
The existence— the amount of existence and how
things exist and stuff. It's weird because you
can think, like, I know what it is, I think,
but I can't. I think the amount of existence
is the best I can do.
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This boy, grappling with concrete and abstract notions of time and
to reconcile them, shows the difficulty people have malcing new
constructs. Even though he finally came up with time as "the amount
of existence," he felt that this construct was inadequate, that it
didn't really explain what time was, but that that was the best he
could do at that time. Another eighth-grade boy demonstrated the same
attempt to reconcile concrete and abstract notions of time but did
not articulate any confusion about it. To him time was simply, "a
measurement. It's a measurement of continuance. Time is now, then,
future." The apparent ambiguity and lack of clarity in his construct
did not concern this boy at all.
Another boy, a student in a seventh-grade advanced class, shows
the gradual evolution of a construct of time. Initially, he said,
time is "the forming and like going through all the patterns, I guess,
like the forming of the patterns first and then practicing those pat-
terns and then creating new ones." When asked for an example, he
tried to articulate one and in the process found he wasn't really
talking about time but then concluded with a construct of time.
Well, like, uhm, a long time ago before man was
around, well, man started to form and then it
stayed in that kind of thing and then it changed
to another level of man and stayed like that and
along that time, along that time it developed
culture. I don't know if you can call it time.
It developed culture, but, but like time would
be the space in which things develop, I think.
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As he talked this boy went from a general notion of time as related
to patterns of cultural development to a separation of the two con-
cepts and the articulation of a fairly abstract though vague notion
of time. Although this construct will be refined as the boy thinks
about it, he has demonstrated one of the attributes of abstract thought,
the ability to conceive of time as a measurement without reference to
a particular event or to immediate physical observances.
Abstract
Abstract constructs of time relate to multiple variables, stated
or unstated, that comprise the universe and its subjects. They also
demonstrate a perspective that comprehends the imposition, by people,
of a structure onto life, existence, and motions of the solar system.
Abstract constructs demonstrate the perspective of being able to look
at oneself from outside oneself. Abstract constructs of time generally
refer to time as a culturally determined method of organizing, a
man-made concept, a measure of life, or a period of life. Abstract
constructs frequently contain several interrelated subconstructs.
"Time is measurement of the past history, the present, and the future
history. It is the way in which history moves." "Time is a measure-
ment of life, a length, an age. Time is unchangeable; you can’t change
what has happened." Some abstract responses stated more precisely,
time is "a man-made concept used to organize our lives."
Other abstract notions which creep into constructs of time have
to do with its endlessness and its relation to individuals. As a
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high school student wrote, "Time is the only eternal force. Nothing
can stop time. People only live in a fragment of time's history."
"Time is the passage of existence in the universe." "Time is from the
start of the universe to the end."
An attribute of abstract thought is the ability to identify
different interpretations and applications of a concept and establish
the connections between them. Two advanced ninth-grade students
demonstrate this by stating that time is two separate constructs
depending on what one is talking about. As the girl stated.
It's just made up so that you can have something
to measure things by so you can say, like, if
you want to meet somebody you can have a specific
way to meet, to say we're going to meet at such
and such a time; and it's important for our culture,
but for a lot of other cultures it's not. For
farmers it didn't used to be because you didn't
say I'm going to work from nine till five. It's
only important in the kind of structured society
we have here. It's only important to me, really,
in things related to school and in other ways
it's not really.
Similarly, the boy defined time in terms of what one is talking about.
First, he said, there is.
The time, the present. Time is just a way of
more organizing our lives so you don't just
know what you're going to do and where you're
going to do it but when you're going to do it,
so it makes more of a definition of when some-
thing happens, when you're going to do it,
and it gives more organization to everyone's
life.
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Secondly, there is,
the passage of time [which] is more or less the
passage of events that happen throughout differ-
ent times; no . . . uhm . . . it’s just the pas-
sage of events through our history—the course
they take. They take it through time and as time
progresses more things happen and history progresses.
As he went on this boy explained how he thought the idea of using time
to organize came about and also pondered the difficulty of defining
time
.
I don’t understand how it [notion of organizing with
time] would have just popped up into someone's head.
I don’t understand how that would have all of a
sudden started. I would think . . . it’s just
like a fact that went along with evolution or what-
ever that time was to progress. Time was. That’s
what. Time was. It’s . . . the problem with
time is it’s abstract— it’s not a concrete
thing. It’s very abstract so it’s hard to define.
He went on to explain what he meant by abstract and finally arrived
at the idea that there is something immutable and absolute about time
that is not open to interpretation.
Well, it’s not like an object or a thing. Time
is . . . it's a passage and you can’t describe it
because time is the base of . . . there’s not really
a good definition for time. I’m curious as to
what the dictionary says for it, but there are
certain words that are the most basic you can
get and words like "the,” and things like that
you can't define; and time seems to be one of
them because time is based on time. And so,
really, it’s hard to describe because it's been
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that way for a long time, you know— time doesn't
seem to be one of the things that can be inter-
preted a lot, because, like I said, it's like a
base thing and not like a law that's going to
be interpreted and perceived by different people
as different things.
This boy's interpretation that time is not going to be "inter-
preted and perceived by different people as different things,"
certainly is not supported by the variety of constructs of time
created by secondary students. The great diversity of time constructs
categorized as concrete, transitional, and abstract demonstrates this
variety
.
Attitudes toward Time
Furthermore, another 20% of the sample, instead of giving a
construct of time, described its significance or told what they thought
about it. These comments shed some light on young people's attitudes
and emotional feelings about time.
Time is important.
Time is money.
Time is something that goes very fast and there
is little of.
Time is new development and knowledge that is
going on all the time.
Time is every minute saved.
Time is something you use to do things. Saying,
"Killing time is not murder; it is only suicide."
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Time is wasted. I don't know if or when time
will run out on the world, but I know it runs
out on people. Many don't get to do the one
great thing that they have always dreamed
about
.
Time is that which passes us by.
Time is important, but it should not be that
Important as to interfere with your life.
Time is something which goes by too quickly.
As these comments show, young people have some fairly strong attitudes
about time. These attitudes seem to change as the students get older.
In the seventh and eighth grades, when young people are beginning to
realize that time is something other than a clock, they seem to con-
sider time helpful to them. It helps them organize their lives and
plan their schedules. For some, this positive attitude remains, but
for others, particularly high school students, time seems to turn
against them. The time pressure students feel and the importance of
time in their lives seems to produce a feeling of helplessness.
Time is my clock radio that stares me in the face
all the time — like always unrelenting, ever-present,
never 'll let me go. I'll smash it to pieces when
I get the chance.
Time is the despicable force that dominates my
life. I set up multiple buffers to attempt to
shield myself from Time, but I am powerless.
Time is the ubiquitous force that manipulates my
moments, hours, and days. I am merely Time's
marionette, dancing helplessly from its oppres-
sing control. I make believe I am free of Time,
that I exist and "float," if you will, above and
beyond Time's dominance. But this is a game, a
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losing battle wherein Time always wins. Time is
not tangible but it pervades my life day in and
day out. Time is irrelevant and does not affect
me no anger does it produce, no frustration
does it evoke—oh, but a wish.
Time is wasted—a phenomenon that can be fast
and slow. The more time I have the more time
I waste. Something you are always struggling to
save, but never can grasp.
Time is the way you deal with your life, your
problems, ideas, goals. The way we do things.
Time is like the wind. You can't see it except
for in your mind. I sometimes wonder what would
happen if we didn't have it. Would there be
more problems or less?
Time obviously bewilders, frustrates, angers, and helps young adoles-
cents. It also plays an increasingly important role in their lives
and yet there is little discussion of it in schools, except when stu-
dents are urged to get organized and plan their time, and little
consensus among students as to what it is.
Learning about Time
Student comments about time also show the tendency of people to
forget, or at least not be able to articulate beliefs that are no
longer acceptable to them. The older students, who have clearly added
an abstract overlay to their notion of time, have no recollection of
how they first learned about time and in fact think that "it seems
like a naturally inborn thing, but it's not. You don't have to learn
about it . . . it's existence . . . everything you have will be based
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on time. Or, as a ninth—grade girl in an advanced class stated, "I
guess it—knowing about time—just came as, like talking, came to me."
These students also thought that their ideas of time had not changed
from when they were little, but rather that they know more now, so
that it s the same definition
—it just applies to a lot more things."
"1 think now I'm just a little more concerned with time just because
I need to be more concerned with it because there's more, like, homework
and things."
In contrast, the younger students in a transitional phase can
state quite clearly how they first learned about time and how their
ideas and understanding of time have changed. An eighth-grade girl in
an advanced class thinks that her understanding of time has changed
from when she was little because "when I was little I really didn't do
much. Just sit around and do nothing and, like, it would be time for
lunch and time for supper; but now I have to go on a certain schedule
like school, then ballet, and eat, and do music and homework; there
has to be a certain time reserved for everything."
Other eighth-grade students attribute the change in their ideas
of time to their greater knowledge. "When I was little I thought time
was something that had to do with the clock; but now I know more
about history and I know, like, centuries mean a hundred years, and
that's time too. That's how I think it's changed; before it was just
like hours." An eighth-grade boy discussed his realization that
"time is not a solid object. When I was little,
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I thought it was something, something that the
world was made out of because they said "a long
time ago." I thought that was something that,
you know, you say, "an island far away." I
thought it was an object, something the world
started from.
He then described going to a planetarium and listening to a definition
of time that "had a lot of big words—when you're three years old there
are some things you don't understand."
Another eighth-grade boy, who is beginning to develop an abstract
construct of time, remembers trying to first learn about time and
recounts his little brother, aged eight, who is presently struggling
with time .
Well, maybe it's because you experience it in a
way
—
you can't just say this is time as in a
class. There's no class called learning about
time or anything, but you . . . it's hard because
I think the first thing is when you start to
learn to tell time, and from there you learn that
there are so many minutes and hours; and mostly
I think it began with my parents because I see
my little brother who's starting to learn about
time, and "the big hand's on the twelve and the
little hand's on the two and it's two o'clock,"
my mom would say, and things like that. It's
weird because you think, oh well, it's so easy,
and then you see him sitting here and, like,
I'd say, "Adam, what time is it?" and he'd say,
"I don't know" and "Well, what's the big hand
on and what's the little hand on?" And you take
it for granted because it's not ... I mean it
is complicated, because, I mean, you almost want
to say, "Why is there time?"
This boy, in commenting on his brother's confusion over telling time
went on to comment on his own development and the confusion he is
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experiencing as he begins to construct time as an abstract phenomenon
as well as a means of organization.
I know it was very confusing; it's still confus-
ing now because it's just . . .it must be very
hard for a child to . . . say, oh well, because
you can't label time as something if you have
to learn it and be explained it. It's very
frustrating and that's all I know.
But he can describe his changing views of time even though they are not
yet all clear to him.
For a while there I think I took it [time] for
granted. Time was one o'clock to two o'clock
type of thing. Now I start to think of things
like more concepts of being on a schedule
—
school, homework, playing and everything and
getting to appreciate that you have so much
time to do different things— I think about it
more. Like, I think it means more to me also
because before it was just a certain thing,
and now there's
. .
.
just, I can think of
many more aspects of it partially because I
know more
.
A seventh-grade boy stated that his ideas about time are different
now primarily because "I think about it more. I don't just, well,
say "time is time." Other students expressed similar sentiments.
They think about time more because it is more important to them to be
able to organize a schedule, and they also express a greater awareness
due to greater knowledge. Attitudes about time, awareness of time,
and constructs of time obviously differ greatly from one grade and
academic level to another.
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Conclusion
Despite the variety in student constructs of time, some general
trends can be observed as Table 5 on page 72 shows. A number of
reservations need to accompany the interpretation of this chart, however.
First, although percentages are a handy way to make comparisons, the
small number of students in each sample means that the percentages
should be taken as a general indication, not as a conclusive figure
for students of that grade and academic level. Secondly, the responses
obviously are what a particular student was verbally capable of, and
not all students express themselves well with words. It may be that
the social studies teacher who told his class, "If you know it, you
can state it," was wrong. It is also important to remember that the
data, by their very nature showing the prodigiousness of early adoles-
cent thought, resist categorization and counting. Looked at within
these limitations, the percentages do allow some interesting obser-
vations .
Students in advanced classes at all grades tend to produce a
higher percentage of transitional or abstract answers than students at
standard and basic levels. More than half of every advanced level
class put either transitional or abstract responses. This is also
true of standard high school classes after the fall of the ninth grade.
Students in basic level classes, in all grades, tend to give a high
percentage of concrete or noncategory responses. The exception to
this is the basic class in the eighth grade. In this class of eight
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TABLE 5
Relation of Time Construct to Grade and Level
Fall Spring
% in each category % in each category
Grade
and
Level
Number
in
Sample
No
Response
Noncategory
(Evaluative) Concrete Transitional Abstract
==
.
^
'•
iransitionaj.
&
Abstract
Combined
Number
in
Sample
No
Response
Noncategory
(Evaluative) Concrete Transitional
,
Abstract Transitional
&
Abstract
Combined
Seven
Basic 18 17 27 17 39 13 54 23 23
Standard 25 24 20 28 24 4 ; 28 24 29 10 36 25 25
Advanced 21 5 28 67 67 24 12 17 17 46 3 54
Eight
Basic 9 22 56 11 1.1 8 25 25 50
Standard 26 15 38 8 31 8 39 23 13 18 30 35 4 39
Advanced 21 5 15 80 80 23 95 5 100
Nine
Basic 12 8 50 17 25 15 27 46 27
Standard 22 9 41 36 14 14 22 32 18 50 50
Advanced 24 8 17 58 17 75 25 4 4 84 8 92
High
School
Basic 16 13 44 25 5 13 18 5 20 60 20
Standard 42 7 21 10 52 10 62 24 21 9 66 4 70
jAdvanced 24 8 1 4 63 25
.
88 20 10 1C 55 o00
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students, four gave transitional responses in the spring.
In terms of change, the greatest change in advanced classes seems
to come in the eighth grade and in standard classes in the ninth. The
eighth-grade advanced class went from 80% transitional in the fall to
100% transitional and abstract in the spring. The ninth-grade standard
class gave 14% transitional responses in the fall and 50% transitional
responses in the spring. Another aspect of the change in responses is
the disappearance of concrete responses among advanced students after
the fall of the eighth-grade year. With the exception of two responses
in the spring from high school students, no advanced level classes gave
concrete constructs of time after the fall of their eighth-grade year.
The standard classes, on the other hand, in both eighth and ninth grade
had a high percentage of evaluative responses. The need these students
have to organize their schedules and use time to help them seems to
dominate their thoughts; hence, their responses that time is "useful,"
"important," "something not to be wasted."
In addition to the observations made about time in relation to
grade and level, some general statements about time constructs can be
noticed. Those constructs which are concrete are similar. Also, most
people relate time to space, consider it permanent and uncontrollable.
Beyond this, however, each individual has his own construct. Classroom
teachers, using the word "time," need to consider that every student in
the class understands that word differently.
Classroom teachers might also spend some time letting students
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discuss their constructs of time, but they need to be aware that a
person who constructs time as a clock or hours, minutes, and seconds
is going to say, if anything, "I don't get it," when one of his peers
says, "It's the space between events." Aside from trying to teach
children that are too young about clocks and helping junior high school
students develop schedules, schools do nothing to help students under-
stand and articulate a concept central to VJestern culture.
In addition to helping students, discussion of time could help
teachers learn more about how students learn and what happens when new
information and knowledge, a new set of structures if you will, super-
sede previous knowledge and structures.
Constructs of History
Introduction
Unlike constructs of time, students' constructs of history,
regardless of the age or level of the student, are all about the
same, suggesting that this construct is one which is taught and which
the students learn. Older students may phrase their constructs with
more sophistication than younger students, but the general idea is
that history is "the past." A seventh-grade boy in a standard class,
for example, stated simply "the past" while a ninth-grade girl in an
advanced class expanded on that simple phrase by explaining, "History
is the past. The events and people which make up culture and the
families back then." A seventh-grade girl in an advanced class artic-
ulated the same notion. History is "the past of people, places, and
countries." An eighth-grade boy in a basic class phrased it simply,
"History is the stuff before now." Another eighth-grade boy defined
history as "records of things that have happened, occurrences," and
a ninth-grade boy in an advanced class defined history as "events
which have occurred in the past leading up to the present." Despite
some minor variations all these constructs basically define history as
the past and hence do not tell much about level of thinking, though
they might tell something about ability or willingness to elaborate.
Learning about History
General agreement also exists among students that they began to
learn about history in the fourth grade. Some felt that they might
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have studied it earlier, but it didn't make sense to them. Interestingly,
most fourth—graders have been utilizing concrete operations for two or
three years, and it may be that the concrete operational child's
penchant for details and specifics allowed him or her to remember the
specifics of history presented at that time.
Historical Events
An eighth-grade boy described in some detail how he learned history
and how he sees his little brother struggling with it. His commentary
is particularly interesting because the student describes how young
people go gradually from a totally egocentric point of view to a more
sociocentric point of view.
I remember. OK, in fourth grade I know we did,
and I'm pretty sure we must have done a little
in third grade .... I have a feeling there
might be times I don't remember earlier, or
maybe it wasn't even that early, but I do remem-
ber fourth grade.
I mean before then you couldn't understand it
anyway. Like, if I started learning when I was
in first grade I probably really didn't under-
stand it anyway.
I mean because as a person I think I know because
I see my little brother starting in first grade
and . . . there are certain things your mind
doesn't handle. Like, I know if I tried to
teach him about history right now he just . . .
or it's something that doesn't interest him,
and I don't think he could really learn, so maybe
third or fourth grade is about the right time.
Like I can just see him, my little brother, say,
"It's boring," and I could see myself saying.
not"Well, I don’t want to learn about that" and
necessarily saying, "Well, what do you mean?"
by not understanding, but not even wanting to
understand. There are so many other things that
a little kid would rather do and put their mind
on than that.
My fourth-grade teacher was not very good— this
teacher that taught me history—and the main thing
was, "Read this and have a test on it or talk
about it"; but it wasn't a very good thing on
history. A lot of the time . . . like I think
really this year has been the first time I've
really had a lot on history, because like a lot
of the time you say like, "Oh, I know we had pres-
idents—there was a war and we won," and a lot of
time like you take it for granted. About history,
you don't really care. You just know what
happened, the main idea, so I really didn't have
a really good thing until now because it was
just . . .1 think maybe some of the teachers.
. .
maybe that teacher took it for granted because I
know it's not easy to teach. I can imagine it's
not, especially because you know what it is and
you sometimes might think, well, they're supposed
to know that and the kid is just learning it; so
maybe that was the teacher's problem.
Like history to me would have been, probably birth
would have been your first major history thing.
Uhm, to a little kid . . . like on my first birth-
day party would have been like history to him
because that's something that relates to his little
world and, yah, it would be very simple things that
would be something that would mean a lot to a child.
Because I mean a birthday party really isn't his-
tory, but to a seven-year-old his fifth, when he
was five— that birthday party is history to him
because it was a special event, and things that are
happy and some that are sad ....
At first they [history events] were, like I said,
the birthday-party type of thing and small little
things that related to me personally; and then
things eventually, I assume, would have gone to
my family and then my neighborhood and town ; and
now I can understand them as my country and as the
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world and how it was created and everything; and
so it’s broadened I think mainly, and of course
history means a lot more now because then it was
just that small little bit of things interacting
with me as a very small child, and now they can go
beyond. I can. They can mean as much as I can
think, as far as I can understand and comprehend.
The gradually broadening view of what constitutes an historical
event articulated by this boy appeared clearly in the questionnaires.
Examination of historical events that students consider important
reveals that seventh-graders, as opposed to eighth- through twelfth-
graders, still depend strongly on their personal history for histor-
ical events. Regardless of level, roughly 25% of these seventh-grade
students when asked, "What historical events do you know about that
mean anything to you?" replied, "my birthday," "relatives," "when I
got my horse." Asked to explain the meaning of these events they
stated, "I'm alive," "shows a sense of love," or "when I got my horse."
When asked what these events have to do with them, these students made
responses such as, "Things I have listed here have to do with me" or
"I take place in all of these events." These students, clearly , in
terms of understanding historical events, demonstrate an egocentric
perspective. They view history in terms of personal history because
they are, in terms of perspective- taking, at what Selman (1976) refers
to as the self-reflective stage. These views of history are similar
to those discovered by Coltham in her study of children’s notions of
history
.
Xn the upper grades a very few students, when asked for historical
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events, also supply personal events, but the majority simply list two
or three events such as the Civil War, the landing of the Pilgrims,
the death of John F. Kennedy, the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor,
the Vietnam War, or the birth of Christ. These responses suggest the
increased knowledge of historical events and wider perspective asso-
ciated with transitional thought. However, because of the concrete
nature of the question no definite categorizations can be made.
Examination of what these events mean, however, in some cases
more readily suggests different levels. Forty percent of the students
simply explained the event; for example, "The Japanese bombing of Pearl
Harbor caused the United States to enter World War II," "The Civil War
means freedom for blacks," "Christmas means Jesus is born." These
simple explanations cannot be categorized as concrete, transitional,
or abstract, but the remaining responses can.
Concrete responses are those of a personal nature such as "why
I'm here," or those denoting a personal connection to the event such
as "World War II means my grandfather's death in Finland." Typical
concrete responses show the importance of self in the explanation of
the meaning of an event.
Martin Luther King's assassination [means] it
makes me feel sad because he was killed on my
birthday.
Birthday [means] you get older.
World Series [means] I like baseball.
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Born [means] a lot to me.
I was born [means] I don't want to be alive.
World War II [means] I'm German so it is kind of
important to me to know about it and explain it
to other people, etc.
Although some variation exists among these responses, their totally
egocentric perspective categorizes them as concrete.
Transitional responses, on the other hand, combine the egocentric
elements of concrete with the broader perspective associated with
abstract thought. Though tied to a specific event, these responses
generalize about it. They may in this generalization draw a conclusion
about how people behave. For example, "The Civil War" means "that
people are willing to fight for other people." Thus transitional
responses use the specific event but apply their thinking to a scope
wider than just the event itself. As the following examples show, they
begin to introduce additional variables, ideas not implicitly stated
in the event itself.
World War I [means] danger.
Columbus discovered America [means] we have more
land.
Signing the Declaration of Independence [means]
this country is going to have freedom.
Allies' victory in Europe [means] I speak English
not German, and live the American way, not any
other
.
The Declaration of Independence [means] it gives
me my freedom.
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Th6 Civil War [means] destruction, death, poverty.
The shooting of Reagan [means] that there are a
lot of sick people in the world.
Watergate [means] that untrustworthy people may
be running the country.
The shooting of Martin Luther King, Jr., [shows]
what a violent country we are.
Women's lib [means] more due equality to women.
Transitional responses, such as those above, predominated in advanced
classes of all grades and were also common in standard classes of
grades eight through twelve.
The abstract responses demonstrate, in addition to a desocio-
centric viewpoint, Piaget's (1958, 1972) observation that those who
can think abstractly have the capacity to direct emotions at abstract
ideals. These responses show a concern for humanity by seeing wars
as symbolic of "hate within humans" or nuclear bombs as "science used
for suicide of a civilization." Other abstract responses demonstrate
the idealism of the adolescent.
World War I [shows] modern extent of violence and
stupidity. World War II [shows] the violence and
stupidity won't stop.
The birth of Jesus Christ [means] the beginning
of a new life for every human being.
Apollo II landing [means] the one chance mankind
has for survival.
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Abstract responses, such as those above, were Infrequent and appeared
primarily among advanced-level high school students who have a broad
perspective on the world.
Event Has to Do with Student
Concrete
Perspective is also the key to categorizing responses that students
gave when asked what the event has to do with them. Again, perspective
ranged from egocentric to sociocentric. Those responses categorized
as concrete were totally egocentric. The students stated that if they
weren't there the event had nothing to do with them. One student,
although he said that World War I meant "men dying for their country,"
stated that these events "have nothing to do with me. I didn't know
any of these people. It wasn't my time." Other concrete responses
contained the same general idea.
The discovery of America [has to do with me]
—
1 don't know. I don't care.
War I and War II [have to do with me]—Nothin'
.
Columbus discovered America and Marie Curie
discovered medicine [have to do with me]—Not
anything really except that now we will have
more land and medicine. Otherwise I don't
have anything to do with it.
Martin Luther King's assassination [has to do
with me]—It doesn't really have anything to
do with me except he was shot on my birthday.
About 15% of the responses were of the concrete type.
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Transitional
Transitional responses appeared in about 50% of the responses
given to this question. Again, these responses are personal, with
dependence on self, but they do show an awareness of a relationship
between self and event. Sometimes this relationship had to do with
the existence of the individual and the individual's rights. "Without
them [events] my life would have been (or will be) very different."
"Well, if Columbus did not discover America I would not be sitting
here doing this test." "Well, they made me be free in this world
doing what I want except kill or steal."
Some transitional responses were more sophisticated and represent
a broader perspective and higher level of thinking which is, however,
still transitional because of its dependence on self. These students
broaden their perspectives to include groups of people, such as
generations of U.S. citizens. They see themselves as part of a larger
group.
Reagan was shot and Columbus landed [have to do
with me because] they affect me as a U.S. citizen.
The evolution of man, the discovery of America by
Columbus, Allies' victory in World War II, Voyager
project [have to do with me because] the first
three shaped the environment in which I now live
and the fourth may shape the environment where
I will live.
The Revolutionary War [has to do with me because]
it has to do with my and everybody else's
freedom and rights.
The usage of insulin [has to do with me because]
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I, myself, am a diabetic and am a part of the
usage of insulin.
The death of John F. Kennedy, Watergate, the
Vietnam War, the assassination attempt of
President Reagan [have to do with me because]
all of these events took place in my lifetime,
with the exception of the assassination of
J. F. K. which occurred just before my birth.
All are related directly to the nation in which
I live and all deal with the political system
which is the most publicized of all our systems.
The bang, the Civil War, the thing Lincoln
wrote, and women can vote [have to do with me
because] they all change the surroundings
gradually so when I’m in it, it is a certain
way. If there was no Civil War, the English
could still be ruling over us— there could
possibly still be slaves if things hadn't
changed, and also I as a girl have more rights.
The Civil War [has to do with me because] it
affected the U.S., and I live in the U.S. so in
a way it affected me.
World War I and World War II [have to do with
me because] they affect the way I view other
events
.
The Declaration of Independence and the making
of the first comic book [have to do with me
because] the Declaration of Independence is the
founding of the country I live in. If I lived
in Russia, China, or Belgium I would care about
the date of the founding of that country. The
founding of comic books marks the day that a new
kind of hobby was made. I like comic books.
The phrasing of the question, "What do these events have to do with
you?" may have resulted in a higher number of students referring to
themselves in their response than would have been the case otherwise.
There were, however, some abstract responses in which the students
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did not do this. These transitional responses show the students'
ability, as Adelson and Beall (1971) also found, to view themselves
as part of a larger whole, as part of a country, a society, a genera-
tion; but they still must refer to self.
Abstract
Abstract thinkers, on the other hand, show a broader perspective
and view the event and its relationship from a large, or world
perspective. These adolescents have so assimilated their concept of
self with the world at large that they do not need to refer to them-
selves when answering the question, "What do these events have to do
with you?" Their responses are broad. "Any past event ultimately will
have some sort of effect on any individual, whatever it may be." "They
[Civil War, Declaration of Independence] provide freedom which many
other countries do not have." These responses also show what Piaget
and others have noted in adolescent thought, the application of emotions
to abstract ideals rather than to people or personal items. Further
evidence of this appears in the following abstract responses:
The birth of Jesus Christ [has to do with me
because] maybe without Jesus no one would be
here or maybe we would all be evil people.
Apollo II landing [has to do with me because]
as a human, I am concerned with the welfare of
humanity
.
Hitler in Nazi Germany killing Jews [has to do
with me because] Hitler was in the world. I
am in the world now. It means that if something
that horrible happened once it can happen again or
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something equally horrible-- and that we all have
to keep on fighting. Everyone, including me.
The birth of Christ, the Declaration of Independ-
ence, and the first test tube baby [have to do
with me]—everything. All things are relevant;
every event of the past is connected with how I
live today. Every event of today affects the
decisions we make about tomorrow and the distant
future
.
World War II affects me because the aftermath
will be evident for centuries. It was the worst
thing ever to happen, in my opinion; and, if the
effects of it don’t keep World War III from
happening. I’ll know what to think of govern-
ments all over the world.
The change in student ideas about how events are connected to them
clearly illustrates the broadening viewpoint that has been noted
by Selman, Piaget, and others who have considered young people’s
awareness of the world and their place in it.
Connection to History
As one would expect, this widened perspective appears in young
people’s discussions of how they think they are connected to the
history of the United States and the world. Surprisingly, however,
whether or not a young person thinks he is connected to history does
not seem to be related to his ideas about historical events of
importance to him. Consonant with the broadening perspective adoles-
cents develop, the majority of students, 60%, see themselves as
fitting into the history of the United States and a smaller percentage
(52) into the history of the world. Students who were not sure or
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said, "Not yet," made up about 10% of the sample, while roughly 25%
said they definitely did not fit into the history of the United States
or the world (28%). A small percentage of students did not answer:
United States, 5%j and world, 8%; and it is assumed that these students
establish little connection between themselves and the history of the
United States or the world.
Concrete
Although whether or not a student feels he fits into history
tells a little about his type of thinking, the way he articulates his
place in history gives more precise insight. As with other responses,
these were categorized by their degree of immediacy and their perspec-
tive. Concrete responses, referring to self as a statistic, dominated,
comprising nearly 40% of the responses. "Why not? I’m a person and
I was born just like anyone else;" or, as a seventh-grade boy in a
basic class asserted, "Cause I play hockey (and good)." Another
seventh-grader, in a standard class, developed this concept a bit more.
"Because when you live in the United States then you're part of the
history: example—when the President got shot you knew about it in
the present so you could tell people in the future what happened."
Another type of response categorized as concrete was that which
articulated a direct personal connection to either an historic personage
or event or to a particular group of people. These students think
their place in history results from their ancestors or relatives.
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Although in some cases these students show awareness of being a member
of a group, they do not seem to broaden their perspective because of
this awareness. As a seventh-grade girl in a standard class put it,
even though she knows nothing about her ancestors, she is connected
to history "by your relatives and ancestors and all those other people.”
Another seventh-grader, a boy in a basic class, said, "I am part
Indian. A high school student revealed, ”My father's ancestors go
back to the Pilgrims." Other examples of this type of concrete
response include:
My cousin was Jacques Cartier. He discovered
Canada.
My ancestors came over on the Mayflower.
I imagine my ancestors were involved.
The concrete responses are simply matter-of-fact statements and do not
appear to show perspective beyond self.
Transitional
Responses that were judged transitional were of two main types.
Some students thought they did not yet have a place in history but
would in the future because of their contributions, showing a concern
for others and a sense of belonging to humanity. Others commented on
the fact that they were part of a generation, thus demonstrating the
broadened perspective typical of transitional thought that allows one
to see oneself as a member of a group. One eighth-grade boy responded
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both concretely and transitionally. He thinks he is connected to
history because he is related to Paul Revere 's daughter; he also
thinks, "There’s a good chance, about one out of a million, that I
could become a famous name that everybody knows." Other students
thought they might also be connected to history in the future.
Eighth-graders said, "I might do something in the future that might
be remembered;" and, from a boy in an advanced class: "It depends
what happens with me .... It depends what happens with my life,
and right now could be the beginning of my history. It depends on
what happens." Another boy in the same class stated:
My career is not yet established, but I may later
in life become an important engineer, doctor,
politician, etc., though the chances are slim.
Thus, I may change American industry, medicine,
or politics. At my present age, I affect Amer-
ica’s population, consumer consumption, average
school grades of all U.S. students, etc.
This student combines two aspects of transitional thought, the possi-
bility of a future contribution and awareness of being a member of
a particular group. Other transitional responses also combined
several aspects of transitional thought:
I am in the first generation after the sixties.
Our generation will have to deal with the economy
of the country and its problems in a few years.
Everyone my age is part of history in this way.
I think everyone in a certain day or age is part
of history. There’s people of the sixties, teen-
agers of the sixties. I’d be a teenager of the
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eighties, you know, and there's a lot of articles
about that, about how times change and how
there s going to be a lot of change by the year
2,000, and I'll have gone through that transi-
tion . . . . "
Well, everybody's pretty much a part of history,
you know. In the year 3,000 we'll be history
like George Washington was to us, I guess, and
our ways of life and things like that ... to
be known, you have to do something special.
You re still part of it but people just don't
know.
I'm going to be history some day. I'm part of
a society so I'm going to be. You know, I might
not be a major part of it . . . not a major part
necessarily; but no one would think of me as a
part of history' but I would be anyway, you know,
representing America or whatever.
Not in the same way that you have history and
you think of great people in history, you know,
like Richard the Third and King Arthur. I don't
think I'm ever going to become anything like
that, but I might possibly if a great tyrant
comes to the United States. I might be one of
the poor, abused peasants, or whatever, but
nothing really big in history.
Yes, I do [fit into the history of the United
States]. I'm not just speaking for myself, but
for the entire Negro race. Slavery was /is a
part of history. The things that have happened
to slaves during slavery played an important
role in shaping history and society.
Someday I may contribute to history but today
I'm just one in a couple million, but I'm still
that one. I'm like a lot of people, a kid going
to school, living the normal life of a 20th
century teenager in Amherst.
I may discover a way to send astronauts to Mars.
Maybe if I wasn't born different things would
have happened from 1967 on.
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I could do something to help others, so that
their world will be better; they will remember
me and I will fit into history.
Responses related to future contributions, suggestive of the
increased future perspective found in adolescents by Cottle
(1969, 1977) and Wagner (1975), also are at the upper end of transi-
tional thinking because they show potential for influence and concern
for others. Far more answers of this type appeared in standard and
advanced classes in grades eight through twelve than in classes of
other grades and levels. High school students, in particular, demon-
strated this forward-looking perspective. From a high school student
in a standard class came, "I'm going to do something wonderful with
sports and veterinary medicine." A ninth-grader in an advanced class
expressed her future dreams: "I hope to do something worthwhile
enough that other people will appreciate and take notice of it after
I die."
Abstract
A very few students, from advanced classes in grades nine through
twelve, commented from a perspective that was not connected to a
particular time, place, or event. These responses were categorized
as abstract because they seem to give evidence of a broad perspective
on the social system.
We are all products of all that has happened.
We are all affected, perhaps only minutely, but
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certainly affected whether we are directly
involved or across the nation. We are
affected by the mere learning of events and
issues mentally.
I affect history by being a part of it.
History is the time span from the beginning
of time until now. Everyone fits; it's just
that some events matter more to some people
than others.
I am part of the chain of events that are
history. So far I have been like a point
on a line— insignificant in myself, but
part of mass of everything. Eventually I
hope to lead the mass towards Utopia, but
there are too many people right now who feel
like insignificant points more than part of
a mass. An atom is 98% space, however, and
atoms are everything.
These few abstract responses also show the idealism and ability to
manipulate ideas characteristic of abstract thought.
Time and History: Connections and Changes
Whether or not a relationship exists in the minds of young
adolescents between constructs of time and constructs of history
does not appear to be related to grade or level. Just as most stu-
dents consider history to be "the Past," so most of them think
history and time are connected. The nature of this connection does,
however, vary with the grade and level of the student. Younger
students and those in lower level classes establish the connection
by referring to specific, concrete things or places. A seventh-grade
girl in a basic class reported that time is connected to history
because, "Uhm, well, history’s about countries and stuff and countries
were long ago; and some of them, like, ancient." Another seventh-grade
girl in a standard class said they were connected because "they had
time and dates way back then. Dates are time." Similarly, an eighth-
grade boy, in a basic class, used the idea of a date. "Yah, if you
didn't have time you wouldn't basically have history because there
would be no date."
Other students established a connection between time and history
without reference to specifics. An eighth-grade girl in a standard
class said simply, "History is time." Another eighth-grader, a boy
in the same class, recognized that they were related but somehow
different
.
Without time there wouldn't be any history so of
course it's connected. I mean it s not like time is
93
9A
connected to history— it’s more like history is
connected to time, if you see what I mean. Time
is more ... I mean, history is more basic than
time is because if we didn't have any time then
we wouldn't have any history to talk about, and
no one would be here.
A seventh-grader in an advanced class expressed similar confusion.
History takes place in time. Well, so does every-
thing, but history takes place during time is
more like it, but uhm . . . but history takes
place during time, but history isn't time because
it's actions that happen. Time can go by without
any history happening. Like, if nothing happens
in 2,000 years or 2,000 seconds, then there's
no history; but time has gone by I guess.
A ninth-grade boy in an advanced class expressed this same idea much
more succinctly. "Let's see now . . . well, history is that which
happens through time" so they're connected to each other. This boy
had successfully related the two abstract concepts of time and history
so that he could state his connection. This particular student dealt
with all the constructs he considered at a fairly abstract level,
having achieved a synthesis, a restructuring of his concepts, as he
acquired new information that didn't fit with the old.
For most students, establishing a connection between time and
history was a fairly simple process, but one boy experienced his
actual restructuring as he made a connection between time and history
and was quite articulate about it.
Maybe. I really haven't ever thought about the
two of them together. I mean, like I know
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that ... I mean my brain says, "Yes, history
is past tense, and time and history was part
of time"; but I never hitched the two together
in the way I have and it’s almost like they
answer each other. And I did surprise myself
because I wasn't planning on answering that,
and when I did say it right before I did
. . .
I was thinking and then I said it and then I
realized what I had said. It was weird. It
was almost like my brain didn't tell me to say
that . Like I was thinking it and that was a
very good connection. I've never had that
happen to me before.
This student was extremely excited about his discovery, the having of
what Eleanor Duckworth refers to as an "ahh haa;" but that evening
when he tried to describe to his parents what had happened he could
not. He knew that he had made a connection between time and history
that had not previously existed for him but could not describe how
that had occurred. When he looked back at the interview transcript,
he discovered that his revelation had come when he was asked what
things help him learn about history.
Time does. It does because I think about the
history of myself, like remembering back in
time and learning about it; and also learning
about history in school always helps because you
learn about yourself; and we're learning more
about our country and everything, but it's
weird. I never really thought about the two
history and time—meeting each other but when
you asked me what I thought about it .
and they do because .... When you think
about it, if you're trying to learn about
history, history is something past tense and
it's not now and I think . . . like . . . they
weave together cause the past tense was a long
time ago, supposedly, or just a different time,
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not now. It sort of surprised me when I said that.
I wasn't expecting that; but when you think about
it, it does.
This is a marvelous example of a person's mind being just ready
for the reorganization of structure that Piaget (1954) asserts is how
learning takes place. In this particular case, a young person was
asked if two things he had previously never associated were related.
After grappling with this idea, he restructured his constructs of time
and history so that they became, instead of the two separate constructs
they had been, one larger, though still vague, construct encompassing
both concepts.
Because of his new connection and the resultant restructuring,
the boy reported later, he was able to pursue his thinking about time
and history in a much broader way than he had previously and fre-
quently thought back to the interview for stimulation. In fact, he
spent much time thinking about his new construct and was visibly
excited whenever he talked about it. When he compared the responses
he made on his questionnaire in the spring with the previous ones
from the fall, this boy found the second one more figurative, no
doubt an outcome of the connection he had made between time and history.
This was shown in several comments made during the second inter-
view. In the first questionnaire this student was not sure he fit
into the history of the world, but by the second one he was positive
that he did.
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Oh gosh, I wasn't sure at first and now I'm positive,
because
. . . Oh gosh, I . . . I'm thinking, you
know, "Is this me?"—sometimes because it's almost
like you're contradicting yourself saying two dif-
ferent things.
I think the reason here [fall questionnaire] was
because we hadn't done much studying of history
then, and here [spring questionnaire] I'm being
more figurative again because of when we did the
interview; I learned a lot about my own feelings
that I never really thought about; and here I
knew how to express myself. When I answered this
I thought back to the interview.
And, I always, you know . . . whenever I think
about the interview, this whole thing, I think
of my first time when I first made the connec-
tion between the two [time and history] and I
remember when I got home that day and I told
about ... I went to tell my parents, "Hey, I
just made this connection that I never had." I
couldn't even remember how I made the connection
—
just that I had and I was frustrated.
And I remember thinking and then calling out the
answer that connected it, too, but I don't remem-
ber how that occurred.
Asked for any comments about time and history that he would like to
add, he replied,
In the recent one I did [an interview] I realized
the connection between time and history, which I
had never really cared or thought about; and that's
my main . . . Oh, it's just because, I mean . . .
I think there's a lot of things. I think I've
learned a lot just by doing this, but the main
thing was just that I made that connection; and
then the first time I put time is a weird thing.
It keeps on going whether you want it to or not.
The same with history—everything will eventually
be some sort of history even if it's so very
unimportant. Time is a lot of different things.
I can imagine a lot of different times at once.
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but at the same time only focusing on one tiny
second's time; and in the one when I talk about
the interview I just mention ... I think the
two should have been put together because I
think, when I answered the first one and
answered the second one, different things were
going on in my head.
And here, the recent one, the reason I talked
about the interview was because, when I did
this, that's what I was thinking about most of
the time; and trying to think, almost thinking
back on what I said, and it's weird; it's
almost because a lot of the things . . . there
was absolutely nothing that was exactly the
same. I think I was trying to think what I had
said and whether I felt that same way.
Speaking again about the connection:
I think really one of the reasons I couldn't
remember it . . . that wasn't the important
thing—how I did it
—
just the fact that I did.
For this boy, making this one connection between time and history
opened up a wide range of vistas of other possibilities in his
thinking, of which he was well aware. This suggests that a restruc-
turing in one area may in fact allow restructuring or be accompanied
by restructuring in other areas.
When such restructuring occurs, students may or may not be able
to explain how or why the changes occurred. During final interviews,
students read their fall and spring questionnaires to compare their
responses and then commented on any differences. A seventh-grade boy
in an advanced class, commenting on two different constructs of time,
99
observed: Well, I guess then I didn’t think I was changing very
much cause I just got into a pattern for that year, but now I think
I’ve changed and every moment seems to be different. Before, I was
doing all the same things all the time.” He also, demonstrating
increased ability to think in a more abstract vein, did not include
an issue in the fall but did in the spring. About this he commented,
”I guess I thought I couldn’t figure out what an issue was.” This
boy also demonstrated increased sociocentric thinking by articulating
a feeling of being able to change things in the spring which he had
not in the fall. When stating how he would fit into the history of
the world, he said, ”I change things by acting in certain ways.” He
commented about his response, "Uhm, here in the spring, I was just
thinking I can change things by acting in certain ways. And that’s
how, by changing things, I can make history. You know, happenings, like
I said before.”
This boy also during this year began to realize the complexity
of time in terms of how man discusses it.
It’s just that in that short time [fall to spring]
my ideas changed a lot. So . . . and also I was
thinking about tenses in language. You know, like
future and past tense. They’re really . . . humans
can perceive . . . they’re not really. I mean, if
it wasn’t for that human train of thought, that
human train of thought, they wouldn’t really be. I
forget how I figured that out--about the past,
the present, and the future tenses. Because I was
just thinking that things really aren’t like that.
There isn’t a past, present, and future.
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Again, this boy demonstrates that when a person makes new connections
or restructures his thinking, the way in which this takes place appears
to be less important than the actual connections.
Another seventh-grade boy in a standard class demonstrates that
once new constructs are arrived at former ones no longer are acceptable.
Commenting on the fact that he had written "forever" for how much time
he could imagine in the fall, he stated (when comparing with his spring
response)
,
That was stupid. I wrote five years here [in the spring]."
This boy gave other evidence of growth during the year. He defined
time in the spring as the "clicking of a clock" whereas in the fall, "I
didn’t write anything here, cause ... I don't know why." In the fall,
he listed the Declaration of Independence, Columbus's voyages, and his
birthday as historical events but stated that the only one that had to
do with him was his birthday. By the spring, however, he showed a
wider perspective by listing the Holocaust and stating that these
events had to do with him because "I'm a Jewish person." As a general
observation, his second questionnaire made more sense to him. "Well,
the thing I said the second time was probably what I thought about it."
Another student, a seventh-grade girl, in a basic class also
demonstrates an unawareness of change. She had not anticipated that
her fall and spring responses would be different but as she started
reading them exclaimed, "Oh my God. Oh my God— they're so different."
And, in fact, they were quite different. Though she had difficulty
answering most of the items, she was able in the spring to say she
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did not fit into the history of the United States, whereas in the
fall she did not understand the question. Commenting on what caused
the differences, she had difficulty and decided that it was "maybe
cause I know more."
Another seventh-grade girl in a standard class commented about
changes she observed in her questionnaires: "I didn't understand
this one, 'How long a period of time can you imagine?' but I under-
stood it then [spring]." Another change, evidence of increasing
perspective, appears in her responses to historical events. In the
fall she listed personal events such as friends, birthday, and family;
whereas in the spring she made no responses, suggesting that, although
she didn't consider any historical events significant to her, she no
longer considered personal events as historical. Other evidence of
increasing perspective appears in her comment about whether she fits
into the history of the United States and the world. In the fall she
commented that she fit in because "I was born in the United States
12 years ago;" whereas in the spring she added, "\'Jhen they look back,
the people way ahead . . . they look a hundred years ago; they probably
won't know me like they'll know the Presidents and stuff . . . ."
She went on to observe she would still fit in, "but not a lot of
people will know about it." In the fall she felt she did not fit into
the history of the world, but by the spring believed that she fit
"only in a part of it, not the whole world. Only where I live
because I don't go everywhere." Still very much tied to concrete
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structures for her thinking, this girl is nevertheless beginning to
acquire the wider perspectives that accompany beginning transitional
thought
.
Another seventh-grade girl in an advanced class attributed changes
in her responses to her schooling. She was unable to state any histor-
ical issues in the fall but in the spring put down civil rights. "In
social studies we got to see more things during the year. You learn
more about things like civil rights and sexism and racism and so . . .
that'd be more in my mind than in the fall." Other evidence of the
developing abstract quality of her thought is her generational aware-
ness: "Everyone is [part of the history of the United States]. I'll
be seen as a teenager of the twentieth century." In the fall she
had felt she did not yet fit into the history of the United States.
Her comment about time seems to foreshadow the increasing concern
students have with time and the pressures they feel, especially those
that are academically oriented.
It goes too fast and people make such a big deal
about it. I mean, it's amazing how many clocks
there are in the world. I mean, everyone has
these new watches that beep when it's 11:15 or
whatever. I don't think those are very nice;
I don't like them. I don't know. I guess we
have to have it because we wouldn't have any
organization, but I don't think it has to be
such a factor.
An eighth-grade girl in an advanced class demonstrated an increase
in perspective similar to the seventh -grader just discussed. The
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eighth-grader thought in the fall that she didn't really fit into the
history of the United States, though she was "derived from the people
who first moved here." By the spring, however, she felt differently:
"Yes. Everyone and everything does, that has to do with America."
Her comments changed similarly about fitting into the history of the
world. In trying to figure out why there was a difference, she com-
mented, "I don't know. I guess my ideas changed or something," but
she couldn't say what made them change. In her case, the change was
not noticed by her at the time
;
and her unawareness of what caused the
change is further evidence that, for the developing thinker, the change
itself is probably more important than the process.
Another eighth-grade girl, however, in a standard class, expected
to find changes because "I learned more about history so I might know
more how I fit in. You know, just things that I learned would help
me." She returned to this notion when commenting on the events and
details about them which she included in the spring questionnaire.
"It's like ... I guess I learned a lot this year because I put a lot
more in." Her comments about fitting into the history of the United
States also begin to show the adolescent concern with the future that
has been observed by others. In both spring and fall she shows a
social awareness, but in the fall it is past—oriented : I would have
stood up for slavery," whereas in the spring it is future-oriented:
"I'm making the future history." Like many others she rejects her
0arlier views by commenting that she didn' t really think about the
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first one. "It looks like I just did this one to get it over with."
A ninth-grade girl in a basic class similarly rejects a previous
answer. To "Time is how long school is," she says, "That was a very
dumb answer," even though in the spring she really can't answer that
question. "It's hard to explain." She does, however, develop a more
sociocentric viewpoint from the fall to the spring. In the fall she
thought she did not fit into the history of the United States but did
fit into the history of the world because she was born— a very limited
concrete answer about which she commented: "That's pretty stupid."
By the spring, however, she thought that she fit into both because
"We're the future generation and we'll be the people that will run
the world when all the other generations croak."
An eighth-grade boy in an advanced class, who had not anticipated
any changes, showed a dislike of answers from the fall that differed
from what he put in the spring. In the fall, for historical issues
he wrote, "There is not really anything that has some meaning to me or
about me that is historical." Upon reading this over, he dismissed it.
"What? I don't think I meant to write that." Then he thought, "Maybe
I didn't have time," but then discovered, "Yah, I had time." Again,
his change in view about whether or not he fit into the history of
the United States caused him to comment, "I didn't mean to write 'no,'
but .... "
Ninth-graders, upon reading over their questionnaires, observed
little difference between the fall and the spring and, when there
were
4
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minor differences, explained them in terms of their intent or how
they were feeling that day. For the present means
. . , "this spring,
I
put now, today, this week or this year depending on how I feel so
it s less immediate." "This one ... I must have had a little more
time because I was a little more specific on what time is. This
I tried to think of just the general idea, describing it, but basi-
cally they re the same. Those are both the same. Those are just
^ little more condensed than this one." "They* re the same general
idea." "They're basically pretty much the same. I didn't change very
much." These observations by ninth-graders confirm the idea that
seventh and eighth grade is a time of greater transition than older
years. As one of the ninth-graders preferred, "I think you change a
lot more when you're younger."
The ninth-graders also seem generally better able to interpret
their own thoughts and describe what they were doing or how they were
organizing, what they were trying to do and why. Younger students,
particularly eighth-graders, spent much more energy trying to figure
out what they were thinking and how things were organized. This
suggests that in stages of greater transition there is greater con-
flict among ideas and less ability to reconcile conflicting or
apparently conflicting concepts, such as the construct of time as
minutes and the construct of time as a measure of past, present, and
future. Ninth-graders appear to have resolved this issue. They either
see time fairly clearly as a culturally imposed system of measurement
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used for scheduling or just simply view it as
not a lot of wondering about how it began and
musings
.
a schedule— there is
other philosophical
Conclusion
The data presented here show some general trends in adolescent
thinking and offer some insight into the richness and creativity of
early adolescent thought.
Examination of the questionnaires as a whole suggests some
changes in types of thinking, from fall to spring, related to grade and
class level. Because of the small sample in each grade and level, how-
ever, these results should be interpreted as indicative of a shift, not
proof. In advanced- and standard-level classes above the seventh
grade, there seems to be a shift from no response or a concrete
response in the fall to a greater number of transitional responses in
the spring. In the eighth-grade advanced class this is particularly
evident. In this class in the spring there were no concrete constructs
of time. In the upper grades, nine through twelve, in advanced
classes only two concrete constructs of time appear in either fall or
spring. Standard- and basic-level classes, on the other hand, create
a greater number of concrete constructs of time. Abstract constructs
of time appear infrequently and only in advanced classes, grades nine
through twelve, with one or two exceptions.
Constructs of history, on the other hand, do not appear to shift
from fall to spring. Standard- and basic-level students in both fall
and spring generally make no response or create concrete constructs
of history. A greater number of basic students, as opposed to stand-
ard, leave responses blank. Also, few basic or standard students.
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roughly 15-20%, create transitional responses, whereas in advanced
classes above the seventh grade close to 50% create such responses.
Abstract constructs of history are limited to ninth grade and above
and are created by very few students in advanced classes only. This
corroborates others assertions that mature understanding of history
does not come until at least the age of sixteen (Flickinger & Rehage,
1949; Hunter, 1934; both cited in Jahoda, 1963).
The types of constructs created do not appear to be related to the
sex of the student. Boys and girls of the same grade and level gave
similar responses. This had not been anticipated. It was thought,
because of girls' earlier physical maturation (Tanner, 1971), that
girls' responses would be of a higher type than those of boys of the
same grade and level. This similarity of thinking suggests that just
because girls mature physically earlier than boys they may not
mature earlier intellectually. We should not, therefore, assume that
because a girl has matured physically she has developed more advanced
thinking skills.
Eighth grade appears to be a year of major cognitive restructuring.
The absence of concrete constructs among eithth-graders in advanced
classes by the spring of the year suggests such a restructuring.
Furthermore, the detailed observations made by students in comments on
their fall and spring questionnaires seem to support this notion.
Beyond the eighth grade, certainly increased knowledge, experience,
and maturity will foster continual restructuring; but it may be of a
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less dramatic nature. In any event, ninth grade appears to be a year
of leveling off. Students in the ninth grade, whether commenting on
the interviews or examined in terms of questionnaire responses, showed
little change.
In addition to the shifts in thinking suggested by the analysis
of data by grade, level, and season, the data presented here give a
glimpse into the extraordinary and inventive thinking of the young
adolescent struggling to make sense of his ever-changing world. The
constructs these early adolescents create, with their incredible
variety, suggest the types of exciting and creative thinking early
adolescents are capable of. Unfortunately, we seldom stimulate it.
Occasionally, we ask these young people what they think about some-
thing but seldom try to find out how they actually construct the world
in which they live. Seeing a young adolescent groping to master the
abstract concept of time central to Western culture, with little help
from anyone, is surely a rare window into the mind of the young
adolescent
.
CHAPTER V
IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS
Introduction
The data offered several conclusions. A qualitative difference
in thinking does exist when younger students' constructs are compared
with those of older students. More than 50% of the students in basic-
level classes, regardless of grade, produce constructs that are con-
crete or unable to be categorized. These students show little change
during the year. Students in standard level classes in seventh and
eighth grades produce responses that are fairly equally divided
between transitional constructs and those constructs that are concrete
or cannot be categorized. These grades showed little change during
the year. For standard-level students, the ninth-grade appears to
be the year of greatest change. In the fall, only 14% of the ninth-
grade standard students produced transitional or abstract constructs
but, by the spring, 50% produced such constructs.
In all grades, advanced-level students produced constructs that
were categorized as transitional or abstract in at least 50% of the
responses. There was not much change in the seventh grade, but by
the spring the entire eighth-grade class at the advanced- level produced
responses that were either transitional or abstract. Advanced level
students above the eighth grade, with two exceptions, produced no
concrete responses.
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Ill
This study also documents wider perspective- taking noted by other
researchers as students develop more abstract thinking capability.
Students gradually broaden their perspectives. Historical events they
identify as meaning something to them become less personal. The
students feel connected to history as part of a generation instead of
as a statistic.
The results of this study have several implications for teaching
and indicate a need for further research. Although limited to a
predominantly white middle-class population in a small university town
in New England, the richness and diversity of data from that popula-
tion suggest that there is much to be learned about what adolescents
think, how their thinking changes, and how they construct and recon-
struct various concepts as their cognitive development goes from
concrete to transitional to abstract. This study provides some
insight into that process. This study also suggests revisions in
teaching and curricular materials.
Teachers
Central in this revision is the need to present materials from
a perspective that fits into the cognitive structures of the student.
To do this, teachers need to be able to determine the level of the
student's thinking abilities. Teachers need to develop the skills
to analyze a student's ideas from the perspective the student uses
and the types of data he deals with. If a student volunteers primarily
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physical objects or things dependent on them when asked for definitions
or examples, if a student responds to a question asking for general
trends with a specific event or person, if a student refers to self
in his comments, channces are that his thinking is still fairly con-
crete; and hence he will be unable to make generalizations that mean
much to him and will not see connections between events that he has
not experienced.
This lack of perceiving connections probably means that a grade-
school student who is studying history pays little attention to any
historical dates that may come his way. His time sense is probably
limited to his own immediate past and, hence, 1492 or 1620 do not fit
anywhere into his constructs. Because of this, it doesn't make much
sense to try to teach dates to young children and probably makes
little more to try to teach them the order in which things took place.
The cognitive structures to make sense of this type of ordering
generally do not appear until seventh or eighth grades.
This is not to say that elementary school children should not
learn about anything that qualifies as history or social studies.
They enjoy learning different things that have happened as their
concrete minds enjoy absorbing information; but teachers must realize
that, in terms of a perspective, these young children will most likely
consider what they are learning as separate stories. They will not,
for example, be able to understand what an ambitious teacher, who
tries to explain how Custer's last stand relates to Indian difficulties
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today, is talking about. Until they have the widened perspective
that comes with transitional thought, they cannot deal with this
type of connection. Teachers should, therefore, resist the idea of
having students memorize connections or lists of dates because in
all probability students, if they do succeed in memorizing these
dates, will only then forget them and decide that history is boring
and dull.
Teachers should, however, let the children deal with history as
stories. Stories about how different groups of people live, particu-
larly if they center around a unit the child can relate to (like the
family), will appeal to their curiosity and, hence, provide them with
insights into different ways of doing things. A child does not have
to know when the Middle Ages were to enjoy and learn from the details
of life around a castle. Later on, when his time perspective and
world perspective have widened to include several centuries and
many countries, the student can recall the stories about the castle
and place them in his newly developed constructs of the world.
It is, by the way, important that these stories be accurate
—
the image of the castle as a warm, wonderful haven is generally far
from true. Taking one castle and its environs and describing, in a
variety of ways, what went on on a day-to-day basis will help the
young child get a realistic sense of what life was like. Later, when
he is fitting this into a broader perspective, he will not have to go
through the disillusionment that accompanies the thinking of a child
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who grows up with the concept of a fairy-tale castle.
In general, the teacher's job at this stage of a child's educa-
tion is to help the child accumulate a variety of stories about how
S^^oups of people lived, without worrying about when or
where they lived. If teachers want to say "a long time ago," they
can, but to the child that will probably mean a few months or possibly
a few years ago. If the teacher corrects this with a date, it will
probably mean little to the child, for he or she doesn't yet have the
concept of how dates work and certainly no comprehension of hundreds
of years. Let the child accumulate his stories and then, when he is
in eighth or ninth, tenth, eleventh, or twelfth grades he will fit
these stories into a larger perspective as he begins to see the world
in a broader fashion.
Content
Presentation of social studies as a series of stories, whether in
the guise of history, anthropology, or geography, seems appropriate to
a young person's developmental level up through the seventh grade.
Also, since many students until the eighth grade think of history
primarily in terms of personal events, these stories should frequently
deal with personal occurrences in whatever culture is being examined.
As students get older, they should be encouraged and helped gradually
to relate their own personal events to their neighborhood, their town,
their state, and so forth. This cannot, however, be done in any way
i
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that will make sense to the child until the child begins to view
things from a point of view other than his own.
Some students will begin to develop a wider perspective, to
establish broader connections between places and events in the
seventh grade; but for many this will not come until eighth grade.
Since eighth grade appears to be the grade of greatest change from
concrete types of thinking to more transitional types, especially
among brighter students, curriculum for this grade should be care-
fully designed to encourage establishment of broader relationships
and perspective as the year progresses.
Teachers can start by asking students what historical events
mean something to them. If the events are mainly personal, teachers
can help the students set these personal events in a broader context.
If someone's grandfather came from the Ukraine and the student wants
to investigate his grandfather's background, let him explore this con-
nection as his interest suggests. If the student thinks the
Declaration of Independence means something to him, let him try to
figure out why and how it is connected to him. If he feels connected
to history because he was born here, let him try to state why this
makes him connected to history and elaborate on that. Or, if he feels
connected as part of a generation, he can investigate that.
Teachers can let students define history. Rather than telling
students what history is, teachers can ask them and let them devise
histories of things that interest them. Teachers can help students
1
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learn about events in the history of the United States but mustn't
expect them to understand, in any comprehensive way, the relationship
between the development of industry in the North and the Civil War.
Teachers need to let students treat historical events and personages
as stories and not be concerned if the students tend to have all past
occurrences happening at more or less the same time. They also need
to recognize that students have difficulty with the concept of more
than one thing happening at once. A fifth-grade teacher attempted to
help her students understand when Halley discovered his comet by
explaining that it was during the Revolutionary War. Her students,
however, wanted to know, "Why wasn't he at the war?" To these minds
the idea of someone discovering a comet when there was a war going on
just didn't make sense.
Cognitive Growth
Just as what is asked of a student in terms of skills such as
reading and writing become more demanding as the year progresses, so
should activities gradually require wider perspectives. By gradually
widening the content scope, both geographically and in terms of time,
the teacher can create an environment which encourages the type of
cognitive restructuring that appears to take place during the eighth-
grade year. Of course, the teacher has to constantly monitor clues
from the students. Is the student less dependent on immediate physical
experiences? Is the student beginning to state things from the
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perspective of a group of which he is a member, such as a class or
generation, or is he still seeing things pretty consistently from his
own perspective, thus not seeing himself in relation to a group as a
whole. By careful analysis of the child's comments and statements,
the teacher can identify the types of perspective from which the child
is operating and hence determine how broad an approach will make sense
to the child and still help him learn. Considerable research exists
that shows that when a child is clearly operating at one cognitive
level, a variety of experiences and learning activities presented at
this level will, in the long run, lead to greater achievement than
forcing the child to try and comprehend concepts in a way that he is
not ready for. Thus, a child should not be asked to deal with infor-
mation in a manner that is, from analysis of his own constructs,
clearly foreign to him. When, however, he begins to show signs of a
change in perspective, he should be provided with material in such a
way as to help him restructure his constructs to permit broader com-
mentary .
Thus one implication of this study is the need for teachers to
develop skills that will allow them to analyze the types of thinking
they are requiring and the types of thinking their students are doing.
To do this they must look at more than just the type of thought
produced. For example, if they ask the student to produce a general-
ization with three examples, an activity common in the eighth grade,
teachers need to examine the content of the generalization, if one is
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produced, and the content of the examples to learn the perspectives
from which the child is operating. This will enable teachers to know
at what cognitive level they should present material.
Teachers then need to be able to examine the content they are
presenting and modify it so that it fits the perspective of the stu-
dent. Failure to do this will probably result in one of two things.
The student, being unable to grasp what is being taught, will give up
and say, "It's boring " or "I don’t care," or some similar statement.
Such statements usually mean that the material being presented is too
difficult for the student to deal with. Some students, perhaps
brighter and more highly motivated, even though they don't really
understand the concept, will give the appearance of understanding
because they have learned the form, so to speak, and can produce
statements that appear quite sophisticated and frequently abstract.
When pressed, however, these students usually show little, if any,
understanding of what the concept means or how it relates to other
concepts
.
When students get older and when they have a sociocentric perspec-
tive, they will be able to place the stories and events they have
learned in historical and geographical perspective. Right now the
important thing is to encourage their interest, help them think
creatively at levels that make sense to them and give them interesting
things to deal with. If students are in a transitional stage, help
them to learn to generalize without trying to connect one event to
A
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another. Also, encourage their emotional involvement in what they
are doing. Don't ask them to remove themselves from issues they
are discussing if they want to be emotionally involved with them.
Instructional Materials
The importance of presenting content in a manner and level
appropriate to the learner implies some significant revision in text-
books and other student materials. When adopting textbooks, school
systems usually check reading level but seldom check the concept
level to see if the reading will make sense to students conceptually.
One school system, determining that the reading level of an attrac-
tively designed geography text (Danzer fit Larson, 1979) was about fifth
grade, adopted it as a textbook for average-level students in the
seventh grade. A few examples of this text show that, conceptually,
the material is far beyond the grasp of almost any seventh-grader for
it assumes that the students can take a perspective totally outside
themselves, which is extremely difficult for them to do at that age.
In the long perspective of time, some of the
things that constantly change are the world's
resources. They change, not so much because
the earth changes, but because human skills
change and human needs and desires change, (p. 32)
Our earth is a sphere, or globe. Global think-
ing is an important part of geography. British
economist Barbara Ward put the matter most
graphically when she compared the world to a
spaceship and human beings to its passengers.
"Space-ship" earth is more than a figure of
speech; it is in many ways a reality. All
120
people are bound together by a shared environment
which sustains life. (p. 36)
The Land Ordinance of 1785, which enacted Jeffer-
son's ideas about land division, established
a national system for the division and sale of
land .... The Land Ordinance of 1785 has
thus proved to be a fundamental document which
is still influencing the way many Americans
live. (p. 61)
Not all racial differences are a result of
environmental factors. Some are due to cul-
tural choices, a group's Isolation, or just
•plain change. For example, on the basis of
their cultures people look for certain physi-
cal characteristics in their prospective
mates, (p. 130)
The story of western civilization in Europe
reaches back to about 2,000 B. C. Many long
and important chapters in the human drama had
already taken place in Africa and Asia. (p. 4A9)
Certainly these passages mean little, if anything, to the early adoles-
cent just beginning to get a perspective on himself in relation to his
own immediate group. The sections intended to give historical perspec-
tive certainly do not enlighten the student whose presentation of
historical events includes things like "my birthday" or "when I got
my horse." Even those students who might say the Revolutionary War
will not be able to relate to the concept of a national township
system devised in 1785 or the "beginning" of western civilization
4,000 years ago. Presenting such approaches to a seventh-grader does
not help him broaden his knowledge because there is no connection
between his structures and the material as it is presented.
In this particular book, some attempts are made to tell some stories,
121
but they are presented in a broad and sophisticated cultural context,
such as asking students to relate the belief system of a group of
people to their animal use.
Other texts demand similar, impossible intellectual activity
from early adolescents. What is a student, to whom the construct of
time is "a clock" or "hours, minutes, and days," to make of the time-
lines so prevalent in books for young people? Certainly, these
time-lines are an attempt to present data in a clear way so students
can see what happened before what and, occasionally, so they can see
how one thing is related to another or to several others. Unfortu-
nately, however, until these young people can begin to see time as
a way of organizing, these time-lines probably do little, if anything,
to increase the student’s grasp of history because his knowledge
structures cannot assimilate the concepts required to understand the
time-line. Too many variables are involved. First, there is the
concept of time as linear. Secondly, there is the notion of change
over this linear time. Third, there is the comprehension of people
and events occurring in time and in some way being related to each
other over time and distance. The child, whose thinking is in a
transitional stage, though he may begin to grasp some of this, won t
get much of it. Looking at a line with numbers, places, people,
and events, and turning this into a concept of historical signifi-
cance requires manipulation of ideas on a level that is certainly
too abstract for most young adolescents. And yet, probably because
122
it seems to the adult mind a clear and simplified version of history,
time-lines and similar devices are among the most frequent techniques
used to make history clear to young people. An unstated assumption
in all textbooks and student materials is that young people have
the same constructs of time as adults, and that, if we just show
them what event or personage goes where, they will understand time
and history. This, however, is just not so, for they do not have the
intellectual structures to do so.
Student Response
Again, teachers need to develop their observational skills.
Anyone who has carefully watched early adolescents in a seventh-or
eighth-grade classroom struggling to understand how certain events
affected other events will observe that most students tend to zero
in on whatever concrete material is presented to them. Struggle as
they will, they cannot grasp more than one variable at a time. In
an eighth-grade history classroom, Reagan's election provoked
considerable concern on the part of students— that, as President,
Reagan would do a lot of things that would harm them. The teacher
looked upon this as an opportunity to read the Constitution, which
she would go over eventually anyway. Surely, she thought, this
student concern would make the limitations on presidential power
stated in the Constitution significant and interesting to her students.
Each night the students read a small section of the Constitution in
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a simplified versiorijand each day in class they asked questions,
and the teacher, usually quite successful at making things clear for
students, explained, gave examples, and drew diagrams. At the end
of all this, with a few exceptions, most students could make no
connection between a document written 200 years ago and a new
President. Soipe of them just didn't see what the Constitution had
to do with them or Reagan. Others concluded that the Constitution
had just been written to protect them. The construct of time,
required to compreheild a document written 200 years ago affecting
them today, just did not exist in their intellectual structures.
The teacher, of course, did her best to "correct" their misconcep-
tions, but because the constructs of time and history required for
such understanding were not available to the students, she was not
very successful.
Similarly, students who cannot manipulate ideas have difficulty
relating the Declaration of Independence to the Constitution. To
adults, it may be obvious that if a group of people declares itself
independent of its government, then that group may need to form a
new government. These concepts are, however, abstract and an eighth-
grader, whose thinking is transitional, cannot manipulate all these
abstract ideas at one time, even if he does happen to be able to
explain each of them separately.
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Conclusion
We need to stop assuming that young people have the same mode
i^^^llsctual operation that adults do and that, as a consequence,
if we just make it clear enough or say it often enough it will "sink
in. That just isn't the case. The student who says he doesn't
understand most likely doesn't and probably not because, as he is
frequently told, "You weren't listening" or "Why don't you pay
attention?" or "Next time, read it more carefully." "Why don't you
use your brain?" The chances are he was listening and did read it
carefully and is using his brain, but his brain just is not cogni-
tively at a stage that allows him to comprehend what is being pre-
sented to him.
Instead, then, of presenting early adolescents with material
beyond their reach, we should present them with material that will
enable them to develop the creativity in their thought that the data
presented in this study suggest. From the data here, from its
diversity and ingenuity, our present approach to classroom instruc-
tion seems almost ludicrous. Instead of encouraging students to
create their own ideas about things by presenting them with infor-
mation they can relate to or, better yet, having them present the
information, we narrowly define for them what is important and
consider them successful only if they can deal with the material in
an adult manner. Instead of asking them to imitate narrow adult
thought patterns, we should be helping them develop their own
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thinking patterns. They will be adults soon enough, and the more
they can stretch and explore the capabilities of their young minds
in the concrete and transitional stages of cognitive development, the
more creative and imaginative will be their thinking when they are
older
.
We need to help young adolescents in their struggle to compre-
hend a world that changes for them as their cognitive development
takes place. We need to set up situations which help them gradually
broaden their horizons as they are able to.
The data from this study suggests that social studies textbooks,
if they wish to help the students widen their perspectives and gain
an understanding of history, need to change their approaches consider-
ably. First, they need to stop telling students what conclusions
to draw by the way they structure data. Secondly, they need to stop
emphasizing dates and connections between events and people. Thirdly,
they need to take an anecdotal approach. Sections of a book could
be as follows:
I. Historical Events that Mean Something to Me:
A. Personal
B . Town
C. Other
II. Ways I Am Connected to History:
A. I'm not
B. Through relatives
C. Statistically
D. As part of generation
E. Through future contributions
F. Because of concern for humanity
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III. Events in History:
This section would be a series of sections with
descriptions of different ways of living and
occurrences and inventions. Dates could be
provided, but their significance not discussed.
An approach like this, of course, demands considerable flexibility in
teaching. It would be possible, however, to design curriculum that
followed this general outline and still allow teachers not to have
to design a different program for each student. In fact, ideally,
the students could work in groups to design their own and to learn
from each other. Teachers who are more at ease with a highly struc-
tured content still could, however, with appropriate materials,
conduct a class that more closely parallels the developmental process
of the early adolescent than do the present materials, which present
information from an adult’s organizational principles.
Our goals should be to help students develop their own organi-
zational principles consonant with their present cognitive capabili-
ties, recognizing that these will change as the students develop
and that there is no reason for a thirteen-year-old to state conclu-
sions from an adult perspective. In addition, we need to provide
early adolescents with information that will stimulate them but that
will, at the same time, be within their reach to care about and
understand. Artificial conclusions, drawn for the sake of learning
to draw conclusions, can do little but help students learn that
learning is boring and meaningless.
L
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As these young adolescents express their ideas in constructs
that make sense to them, we, as adults, need to be studying them to
learn more about how these young adolescents think and learn.
Although we know something about learning in young children and have
occasional descriptions of adolescent thought, we know little about
what the early adolescent thinks when asked. Because of the great
diversity among young adolescents and because it is almost impossible
to say anything is constant in their minds except change, little
descriptive study has been done of early adolescent thinking.
This study provides a beginning, but only a slight one, in what
could be a rich and exciting area. It would be nice to have some
insight into the thoughts of the young adolescent as he struggles to
comprehend his ever-changing world. He is changing and his ability
to deal with it is changing, but what do we know about that in terms
of how he constructs it? Very little. Certainly, additional research
is needed in this area, particularly if we wish to develop the cre-
ative potential of individuals instead of steering them into what
appears to be the increasingly standardized and narrow technological
society we are creating.
Also, what about groups other than white middle-class adolescents?
Would similar constructs emerge among early adolescents who were not
from a small, predominantly white, university to\m in New England?
How about relationships to history? Would Midwestern adolescents or
those from California follow similar patterns? It might be that within
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the Western tradition early adolescents from countries with long
histories, such as Greece and Italy, would have different thoughts about
connections to history than those from countries with short histories,
such as the United States and Canada. Certainly, non-Western cultures,
with their circular views of time and their sometimes mythic construc-
tions of history, would produce very different data. And what about
developing nations that are beginning to industrialize? Implicit in
industrialization is a linear sense of time and a sense of history as
a progression, and yet many of these developing nations are not in the
Western tradition and so do not have this linear sense of time. These
non-Western cultures, and the young people in them, should produce
some particularly interesting constructions.
The data from this small study suggest a wide range of research
into concepts fundamental to humanity. Just the results of asking
people to tell what they think instead of asking them to rank five
statements or to agree/disagree, suggest the astonishing variety in
human thought. We need to find out more about this variety if we are
to help this creativity and diversity flourish. Perhaps our research
should be more open-ended. Perhaps we should more frequently ask
people, adults as well as children and adolescents, what they think
instead of asking then to respond "Yes," "No," or Maybe on surveys.
It might be interesting and useful to know the different constructs
adults create of the world and their places in it. For example, con-
structs created by different socio-economic or ethnic groups might be
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helpful to planners seeking to work with these groups or psychologists
trying to understand group attitudes.
Similarly, we can learn a lot about early adolescents by asking
them what they think. What do they think a family is? What do they
think the government is for? What rules and values do they think are
important? By finding out what adolescents think, we can better help
them grow and develop. We need to approach teaching with a sense of
humanity, and within this sense we need to strive to bring out the
best in those we teach. This is not done by helping our young people
mimic adult thought but rather by convincing them of their own
capability and the importance of their own individuality. A start in
this endeavor to help early adolescents appreciate their own thinking
would be to accept early adolescents’ ideas about what time and history
are and to build on these, instead of forcing adolescents to adopt
and pretend to comprehend adult notions.
i
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Appendix A: Time Questionnaire
To the student:
This questionnaire is to show how you think about time and
history. Please answer the questions in the way that makes the
most sense to you. There are no wrong answers on this questionnaire.
It will be used to help determine the best types of classroom
materials to use with students. Please try your hardest.
PLEASE FILL IN THE FOLLOWING:
Age: years, months
Grade:
Male or female:
PLEASE FINISH THE FOLLOWING SENTENCES:
The present, to me, means
An example of something in the present is
Time is
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PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:
How long a period of time can you imagine?
What historical events do you know about that mean anything to you?
EVENT WHAT IT MEANS DATE
What do these events have to do with you?
What historical issues do you know about that mean anything to you?
ISSUE WHAT IT MEANS DATE
What do these issues have to do with you?
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Do you fit in the history of the United States?
If so, how?
Do you fit in the history of the world?
If so, how?
Are there any comments you would like to add about time or history?
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Appendix B
NAME:
DATE:
LOCATION
:
TIME:
INTERVIEW
:
LEAD-IN :
DOING STUDY OF TIME AND WHAT KIDS THINK ABOUT IT. WANTED TO
TALK WITH KIDS OF DIFFERENT AGES SO THEY COULD TELL ME MORE THAN
THE QUESTIONNAIRE HAD ASKED ABOUT WHAT THEY THINK ABOUT TIME AND
HISTORY. KIDS WERE CHOSEN BY TEACHERS BECAUSE THEY CAN TALK
FAIRLY EASILY.
QUESTIONS :
(TO BE USED AS GUIDES)
DO YOU EVER THINK ABOUT
TIME?
WHAT DO YOU THINK TIME
IS?
HOW WOULD YOU DEFINE IT?
WHAT THINGS DO YOU THINK
I
HAVE AFFECTED YOUR IDEAS
I ABOUT TIME?
'can you give any examples?
i
DO YOU KNOW HOW YOU
I
LEARNED ABOUT TIME?
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WHAT IS THE FIRST
THING YOU REMEMBER
ABOUT TIME?
WHAT DO YOU THINK YOU
THOUGHT TIME WAS
WHEN YOU WERE LITTLE?
WHAT IDEAS ABOUT TIME
DO YOU THINK YOU
HAD?
HOW DO YOU THINK YOUR
IDEAS ABOUT TIME
HAVE CHANGED?
(IN WHAT WAY?)
HAS THE CHANGE IN YOUR
IDEAS OF TIME
AFFECTED YOU IN ANY
WAY?
CAN YOU GIVE /\N
EYvAMPLE?
WHAT DO YOU THINK
YOU WILL THINK
ABOUT TIME IN
THE FUTURE?
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r
DO YOU THINK TIME IN
THE FUTURE WILL
BE DIFFERENT FROM
TIME NOW?
WILL IT BE DIFFERENT
FROM THE WAY TIME
WAS IN THE PAST?
WHAT DO YOU THINK
TIME IN THE PAST
WAS LIKE?
WHAT DO YOU THINK
HISTORY IS?
HOW DO YOU DEFINE IT?
1
WHAT SORTS OF THINGS
MAKE YOU LEARN
ABOUT HISTORY?
WHAT IS THE FIRST
THING YOU REMEMBER
LEARNING IN HISTORY?
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WHEN DID YOU LEARN ABOUT
HISTORY?
HOW OLD WERE YOU?
DO YOU REMEMBER HOW
YOU LEARNED ABOUT
HISTORY?
WHEN YOU WERE LITTLE
WHAT DO YOU THINK YOU
THOUGHT HISTORY WAS?
HAVE YOUR IDEAS ABOUT
HISTORY CHANGED?
'CAN YOU GIVE AN EXAMPLE?
WHAT THINGS DO YOU THINK
HAVE AFFECTED YOUR
THOUGHTS ABOUT HISTORY?
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IS YOUR LIFE CONNECTED
TO HISTORY?
CAN YOU GIVE AN
EXAIIPLE?
IS TIME CONNECTED TO
HISTORY?
COMMENTS ON INTERVIEW:
ATMOSPHERE, ATTENTION, ETC.
AFTERMATH:
I WAS JUST SORT OF
WONDERING
I’M CURIOUS ABOUT
YOU MENTIONED
DOES ANYONE EVER
SOME PEOPLE
GRANDPARENT
OLD THINGS
OLD TIMES
ANCESTORS
HISTORICAL CELEBRATIONS
OTHER


